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    Kasper Støvring, The cultural prerequisites of social cohesion. With special attention to the nation of Denmark + Benjamin Richards, National identity and social cohesion: theory and evidence for British social policy + Neli Demireva

    Johnathan R. Razorback
    Johnathan R. Razorback
    Admin

    Messages : 7445
    Date d'inscription : 12/08/2013
    Localisation : France

    Kasper Støvring, The cultural prerequisites of social cohesion. With special attention to the nation of Denmark + Benjamin Richards, National identity and social cohesion: theory and evidence for British social policy + Neli Demireva Empty Kasper Støvring, The cultural prerequisites of social cohesion. With special attention to the nation of Denmark + Benjamin Richards, National identity and social cohesion: theory and evidence for British social policy + Neli Demireva

    Message par Johnathan R. Razorback le Ven 6 Nov - 17:04

    Et si l'utilité politique de l'identité nationale résidait moins dans l'amélioration de la cohésion sociale que dans la minimisation des risques de sécession politique violente, donc favorisait l'ordre public et la sécurité ?

    http://etheses.lse.ac.uk/910/

    "There was a new perception that multiculturalism could be divisive and detrimental to national unity, and a focus emerged of immigrants (and possibly their descendants) integrating into a ‘mainstream’ British culture." (p.10)

    "This shift in government policy towards a new focus on community cohesion, with its emphasis on the important of national identity, has taken place despite a lack of academic research into what the nature of the relationship between national identity and social cohesion might actually be in Britain, and despite a lack of conceptual clarity on how the relationship might be dependent on the precise meaning given to both ‘national identity’ and ‘social’ or ‘community’ cohesion. The research that does exist highlights a number of things of importance. On the one hand, evidence from the US in particular suggests that ethnic diversity may be associated with negative outcomes for some types of cohesion: lower interpersonal trust, social capital and support for redistributive policies (Putnam 2007; Alesina & Glaeser 2004). Other evidence suggests belonging and attachment to Britain may be associated with “social trust, civic duty … and by increased support for the political order” (Heath & Roberts 2008, 2)." (p.11)

    "This study investigates, therefore, whether or not national identity in Britain can be important for increased social cohesion outcomes." (p.11)

    "The quantitative component of the thesis analyses the Home Office’s Citizenship Survey covering England and Wales. It first uses Principal Components Analysis to produce measures of social cohesion, second constructs regression models to investigate whether there are associations between British and English identities and the measures of social cohesion and whether these associations vary by ethnic group, and third asks whether any of the control variables included in the model – measuring, for instance, ‘structural’ issues such as deprivation, socio-economic group, and educational qualifications – might also be important for social cohesion. The qualitative component consists of semi-structured interviews with twenty two respondents of Black African and Black Caribbean ethnicity living in an ethnically diverse area of London. Respondents expressed their feelings of their national and ethnic identities, and any links they might see between these identities and aspects of social cohesion. The objective of the qualitative component was to identify a range of narratives surrounding national and ethnic identities and possible links, or otherwise, to social cohesion.

    The thesis makes four main arguments. First, it suggests that the relationship between national identity and social cohesion in Britain depends crucially on the nature of the concept of national identity in question. It is argued that the distinction between constitutional patriotism, civic national identity and ethnic national identity (e.g. Kymlicka 1995) is helpful, and that British identity – which is at least to some extent a civic national identity –may be more relevant for social cohesion than English national identity, which is largely an ethnic national identity. Indeed, English identity may, in some cases, be associated with decreased social cohesion, perhaps because of its exclusive nature, with its links to being ‘Anglo-Saxon’. Second, the thesis argues that the vague, ambiguous and contested concept of social cohesion might be better broken up into two different types of cohesion, since its relationship with national identity differs depending on the type in question. These types are given the working titles of ‘institutional cohesion’ and ‘associational cohesion’: the former refers to the ability to influence and access public institutions, such as public services; and the latter refers to associational relationships between individuals – such as social and civic activities – and to feelings of spatial belonging. It is suggested that British identity may have some importance for associational cohesion, but may have little relevance for institutional cohesion. Third, the thesis argues that certain types of equality may have much more important relationships with social cohesion that does national identity. For associational cohesion, structural equality –with a particular focus on area-level deprivation and educational qualifications– may be much more important than national identity; and for institutional cohesion, perceptions of discrimination – particularly with regard to equal access to public services – may be especially important. Fourth, the thesis reflects on the role of the nation-state as the appropriate ‘level’ at which to focus on issues of social cohesion and suggests that, to the extent that states are important for implementing progressive social policies, and are important frames of reference for perceptions of equality, the fact that equality was found to be important for social cohesion means that states are, for the time being, important too." (pp.11-12)

    "What was different about the new critique of multiculturalism that accompanied the social cohesion discourse, however, was its emphasis on the former’s alleged role in undermining national unity. The new critique included accusations that multiculturalism had a role to play in “licensing ethnically based ‘ghetto mentalities’ and disunity” (McLaughlin 2010, 97), and sustaining ‘difference’ rather than promoting integration (Percival 2007). There are many examples of this shift, including in speeches and statements of politicians, the media, and policy. A perception that “diversity threatens national stability” (Burnett 2007, 353) has appeared in statements such as Gordon Brown [...]  As leader of the opposition, David Cameron expressed similar view." (p.15)

    "This idea of using a civic notion of Britishness as a unifying tool has been a key theme in the social cohesion agenda since 2001." (p.15)

    "The most rigorous attempt at an academic definition is provided by Forrest & Kearns (2001) (see Table 1), whereby social cohesion is broken down into the following five dimensions : common values and a civic culture ; social order and social control ; social solidarity and reductions in wealth disparities ; social networks and social capital; and place attachment and identity. [...]
    The concept is multi-level in the sense that an individual’s identification with, and relationships within, a group can be at, for example, the national level, the
    community level, or the neighbourhood level
    ." (p.21)

    "Miller (1995, 10) argues that “it may properly be part of someone’s identity that they belong to this or that national grouping”, and that national identity can be important for replicating at the national level the solidarities found in small communities. This can in turn be important for sustaining support at the national level for such things as the political order and the welfare state. [...]
    Putnam (2007, 164), for example, argues that the benefits of immigration are often felt at the national level, whilst the short-term costs are “often concentrated at the local level”, and it may be possible to reduce the impact of these costs by encouraging shared identities. Hirschman (2005) also emphasises what he sees as the long-term benefits to locallevel American society and culture of fostering a national identity and allowing immigrants to become more ‘American’.
    " (p.22)

    "Mirel (2002) describes the way in which immigrants to the US in the early 20th century were initially required to give up their ethnic identities entirely in order to assimilate. By 1950, however, this policy had changed considerably, with American identity being redefined in terms of civic ideals such as respecting diversity. In this way, immigrants were able to simultaneously keep elements of their ethnic identity whilst also adopting elements of an American civic identity." (p.25)

    "Lindley (2002, 427) finds that religious identities reveal important differences in earnings and employment within conventional ethnic categories: for example, “notable differences exist between Indian Sikhs and Hindus”. There is, in addition, evidence of a “pure Islamic penalty”, after controlling for other characteristics, for employment and earnings. Despite such findings, Maxwell (2006) finds Muslims to be almost as likely as those of a White British ethnicity to identify with Britain." (p.29)

    "There is a body of evidence, much of it from the US, that ethnic heterogeneity is associated with lower levels of interpersonal trust, social capital, and support for redistributive policies. For example, Putnam (2007) provides evidence that, in the US, ethnic diversity is associated with a reduction in generalised trust, towards those both outside and within one’s own ethnic group. Alesina & Ferrara (2002) find, again using data from the US, that living in a heterogeneous area and being a member of a historically subjugated group both decrease trust at the individual level.

    There is, in addition, some cross-national evidence to support the finding that heterogeneity decreases trust outside the US: for example Delhey & Newton (2005) find the same pattern across 55 countries, although it is most marked amongst the Nordic nations. Alesina & Glaeser (2004, 218) conclude that the “importance of ethnic fractionalization cannot be overemphasized” in their explanation of the more generous social spending found in Europe in comparison with the US, suggesting that support for redistribution, too, is related to ethnic homogeneity. Noting the lower levels of ethnic diversity in Europe, the overall picture from much of this US-based research predicts a decline in trust, social capital, and support for social spending as Europe becomes more diverse. This creates a pessimistic picture for policymakers in Europe, suggesting that the adoption of progressive social policies will become increasingly difficult and social problems, such as a lack of trust, will increase alongside an increase in ethnic diversity.

    There is, however, also a significant body of contradictory evidence. Banting (2005) fails to find cross-national evidence of systematically lower social spending in countries with large foreignborn populations.  [...]  Letki (2008), in a study of ethnic diversity in British neighbourhoods, finds low socio-economic status to be more important than heterogeneity for explaining social capital." (pp.30-31)

    "What explains these contradictory findings ? [...] One suggestion put forward by many authors, including Miller (1995), Tamir (1993), Canovan (1996), Goodhart (2007), Putnam (2007) and Hirschman (2005), and one that features prominently in the social cohesion public discourse, is national identity." (p.31)

    "Heath & Rothon (2010) fail to find evidence of an inverse correlation between attachment to one’s community and wider society, and find that in fact most members of minority groups do identify strongly both with their group and with Britain. The common presence of dual identities among ethnic minority groups suggests that if ethnic identities accompanied by a lack of British identity are problematic for social cohesion, this phenomenon is not likely to be systematic or widespread amongst minority groups, but may be more isolated." (p.32)

    "Maxwell (2006) finds perceived discrimination against members of ethnic minority groups to make them less likely to identify with Britain." (p.32)

    "There is evidence from the social psychology literature that when group identification is made along ethnic lines, “ethnic identity is related to out-group prejudice” (Smith et al. 2003), and that super-ordinate identities such as national identity may be beneficial to intergroup relations by creating a ‘thin’ identity transcending previously differentiated groups, and thus creating a new sense of ‘we’ (Gaertner and Dovidio 2000)." (p.34)

    "Is the predominant conception of Britain – one that includes an ethnic component – problematic for social cohesion, or would encouraging a civic conception make no difference ?" (p.34)

    "There is a conceptual difficulty with the research question itself, since national identity is something belonging to individuals (clearly ‘nation’ is an area-level concept but it is individuals that identify with the nation), whereas social cohesion is the property of an area." (p.36)

    "There is evidence that suggests people identifying with a Black Caribbean ethnicity may be, in some cases, considerably less likely to identify themselves as British (Heath and Roberts 2008); whilst people identifying with a South Asian identity may be almost as likely as those of a White British origin to identify themselves as British (Maxwell 2006)." (p.40)

    "In terms of the history of immigration into the UK, there was a substantial post-war period of “immigration from the Caribbean, Africa and South Asia [that] was stimulated most of all by the need for labour” (Craig 2012, 54). During this period, immigration was largely from India, Pakistan, the ‘West Indies’, the ‘Far East’, and West Africa, as shown by substantial increases in the estimates of the populations of each of these groups in the UK between 1951 and 1961 (ibid., 55). Given the personal familiarity with several contacts in an area of London with a substantial Black African and Black Caribbean population ; given that the nature of discrimination for these two groups was likely to be relatively similar, being focused on skin colour rather than culture or religion; and given that these two groups may include people that are relatively settled in Britain, opening possibilities for interviewing people from several generations, it was felt that it would be reasonable to target these two groups for interview." (p.59)

    "The interview schedule (see the Appendix, Part B) was intended to ask respondents what they consider their national, ethnic, and religious identities to be, and to ask them whether or not they consider there to be any links between national identity and social cohesion. In this way, it was intended that narratives surrounding the relationships between identity and social cohesion could be uncovered. The open-ended nature of the questions could also, perhaps, reveal whether or not respondents see the concept of social cohesion to be appropriate for describing these relationships." (p.61)

    "What is the relationship between British identity and social cohesion; and does this relationship vary by ethnic group ? In order to answer these questions, data from the Citizenship Survey were used to first produce measures of social cohesion, and second to investigate the relationship between British identity and each measure of social cohesion. Close attention was given to ethnic differences in social cohesion, and to whether the relationship between British identity and social cohesion differs by ethnic group.

    The broad findings discussed in this chapter can be summarised as follows. First, the multifaceted concept of social cohesion, as measured using variables available in the Citizenship Survey, can be considered to break down into ten different ‘elements’ which are as follows: equal treatment by public service providers (general); equal treatment by health service providers ; trust in and equal treatment by the police; satisfaction with one’s place of residence; belonging to neighbourhood and local area; belonging to Britain; social interaction with people of different backgrounds; civic engagement and volunteering; ability to influence decisions of public institutions; and being treated with respect in public.

    Second, these ten elements can be broken down into three broad groups in terms of the extent to which each regression model provides a satisfactory explanation of the social cohesion measure. The first group has a high level of explanatory power; the second group a moderate level; and the third a poor level of explanatory power. For those elements that were poorly explained, further exploration was undertaken to find control variables that were relevant and increased the R squared values; this further exploration produced some success for some of the elements, but only limited success for others.

    Third, the relationship between British identity and social cohesion differs depending on the element of social cohesion in question: it appears to be associated with moderately increased social cohesion for some elements, but have no impact on others. In addition, these associations differ markedly depending on the ethnic group in question.

    Fourth, some variables used as control variables appear to be strongly associated with the measures of social cohesion, and the effect is significantly stronger than that of British identity for some of the elements. High levels of education and reduced area deprivation, in particular, are associated with positive social cohesion measures." (p.63)

    "The overall objective in the measurement of social cohesion using data from the Citizenship Survey was to be able to use the large number of variables identified theoretically as being potential indicators of social cohesion, and create from them a much smaller number of composite variables that could be considered as representing a particular element of social cohesion." (p.68)

    "35 variables that were retained for the final PCA, along with their meanings and possible answers." (p.78)

    "There are associations between British identity and two of the three measures of social cohesion – satisfaction with one’s place of residence, and civic engagement and volunteering – even after controlling for all other factors, but not for socialising with people of different backgrounds. When broken down by ethnic group, British identity is associated with civic engagement and volunteering for all three of the White, Asian, and Black groups, but only with satisfaction with one’s place of residence for the White group. When broken down in such a way, a positive association between British identity and socialising with people of other backgrounds is also found for the Asian group.

    Second, although there do appear to be positive associations between British identity and social cohesion outcomes, at least for satisfaction with one’s place of residence and civic engagement and volunteering, these associations are relatively modest when compared with some of the control variables." (pp.98-99)

    "For the model for belonging to Britain, British identity is (perhaps unsurprisingly) more strongly associated with social cohesion as compared with the control variables, although for belonging to one’s local area area-level deprivation is particularly important.

    Parts 4.31 and 4.32 make an additional argument. When one takes into account whether or not the respondent was born in the UK, for the non-White ethnic groups, nearly all associations between British identity and social cohesion are no longer found for those born in the UK, but are found for those not born in the UK. This suggests that the generation a member of an ethnic minority group belongs to may be of fundamental importance with regard to whether British identity has an impact on social cohesion." (p.99)

    "By far the strongest and most consistent predictor of satisfaction with one's place of residence is the control variable representing area deprivation [...] , living in a more deprived area is consistently associated with lower social cohesion outcomes in terms of satisfaction with one's place of residence." (p.137)

    "Having no qualifications is strongly associated with negative civic engagement and volunteering outcomes, and the qualification associations are the strongest of any of the variables in the model. Higher outcomes in terms of satisfaction with one’s place of residence, and socialising with people of other backgrounds, are also fairly consistently and strongly associated with a higher level of qualifications." (p.139)

    "For the models looking at attitudes to public services and respect, one (tentatively, given the R squared values) finds perceived discrimination to be very important, and certainly more so than British identity. For many of the other elements, area deprivation and qualifications are far more important than British identity." (p.164)

    "This chapter gave a report of the methodology and results of the quantitative component of this study. It was intended in particular to answer the questions: what is the relationship between British identity and social cohesion; and does this relationship vary by ethnic group ? Data from the Home Office’s Citizenship Survey were utilised first to produce composite variables, with each representing a separate element of social cohesion, and second to create regression models whereby British identity, along with the relevant control variables, were included in a model with the social cohesion measures as the dependent variables. Social cohesion, as represented by the variables available in the Citizenship Survey, was found to break down into ten elements: equal treatment by public service providers (general) ; equal treatment by health service providers; trust in and equal treatment by the police ; satisfaction with one’s place of residence ; belonging to neighbourhood and local area; belonging to Britain ; social interaction with people of different backgrounds; civic engagement and volunteering ; ability to influence decisions of public institutions; and being treated with respect in public.

    The ten elements were found to break down into three broad groups in terms of the extent to which the regression model provided a satisfactory explanation of social cohesion indicator. The first group was relatively well explained by the model; the second moderately well explained; and the third poorly explained. For the models that explaned social cohesion well or moderately well, British identity was found to be positively associated with social cohesion for the White, Asian and Black groups in particular. For the White group, however, there is a negative association between English identity and socialisng with people from other backgrounds. The magnitudes of the effects of British identity were also striking: the size of the effects are much smaller than those of area deprivation and qualifications, and (tentatively given the low R squared values) also perceived disrimination, for some of the elements." (p.168)

    "One might distinguish between ‘thick’ and ‘thin’ national identities, therefore, in a similar way. A thick national identity is, perhaps, one that is rooted in a particular culture, with its own detailed description of what is right and wrong, socially acceptable practices, and so on. A thin national identity might then be an abstract notion that members of several different maximal or thick cultures mutually recognise. It will have less cultural ‘content’ than the thick version and, following Walzer’s distinction, will be interpreted differently depending on the culture of the person doing the interpreting, but has the potential to be more inclusive than a culturally thick version.

    If this argument is right, then, for the third group there is a recognition of their belonging to a maximalist culture in the sense that they all have some kind of British or English identity. However, this identity is not considered to be important for positive social cohesion outcomes: what is important instead is emphasising the ‘thinner’ ideas that most people in society can recognise as positive in the abstract: ‘helping other people’, ‘taking responsibility’, or ‘giving something back’ to society; rather than a ‘thick’ code of expectations of language or etiquette.

    So what does all this tell one about how British identity might, or might not, matter for social cohesion ? When arguments are made in support of national identity, they are usually on the basis that it can provide some sense of solidarity between citizens, the vast majority of which are unlikely to ever meet each other to engage in face-to-face interaction, and that this solidarity is essential for such things as the functioning of democratic institutions, redistribution to support equality and social justice, and so on. This argument is made in particular in the face of increasing ethnic, cultural and religious diversity in modern democracies (although such diversity has always been present to some degree, the argument
    is that it makes such solidarity harder to achieve), economic globalisation (which has increased inequality, so solidarity is needed to support redistribution), and as a counterweight to the new, allegedly divisive identities emphasised by the ‘politics of recognition’. If British identity is to serve such a purpose, this chapter suggests three possibilities, each with different implications for overcoming any problems created by increasing diversity, economic globalisation, and the ‘politics of recognition’.

    The first possibility is that the importance of British identity for solidarity is emphasised whilst retaining its culturally ‘thick’ links to status and heritage. British identity and connectedness to society go together in that one either has them or does not, but having them is a matter of status and/or heritage. Emphasising British identity in this way, however, is unlikely to combat any potential problems of increasing ethnic, cultural or religious diversity, since one attains it by virtue of the fact that one is a member of the dominant ‘British’ culture in the first place. For similar reasons, an emphasis on the importance of status and heritage is unlikely to provide a balanced counterweight to other identity claims, since many of the identity claims are a result of the injustices created by status and heritage. It is also unlikely to provide the support for redistribution necessary to combat increasing inequality, since British identity (and therefore connectedness) are attained by status in the first place. According to this possibility, then, British identity is not an inclusive identity, and is unlikely to provide the basis for solidarity needed to achieve any of these three goals.

    The second possibility is that the importance of British identity for solidarity is emphasised in a culturally ‘thick’ way, but one that is open to anyone if they are prepared to conform to certain social expectations. In the context of the integration of diverse ethnic, cultural or religious groups into society, this can be achieved if they are prepared to assimilate. It is unlikely, however, to provide an appropriate counterweight to any ‘divisive’ claims of groups through the ‘politics of recognition’, since assimilation requires the adoption by everyone of a predefined set of culturally ‘thick’ norms, and so there would be no room for other identity claims. The solidarity necessary for redistribution, in order to combat rising inequality, would only be achieved to the extent that all (or at least most) members of society were prepared to assimilate in this way.

    The third possibility is that British identity in its culturally ‘thick’ sense is de-emphasised and that, instead, what matters for solidarity is the mutual recognition by all (or at least many) members of society of some more abstract, culturally ‘thin’ set of ideas that many people agree is important: ‘helping others; ‘giving something back’; or ‘taking responsibility’ being a few examples given by respondents in the sample. In Walzer’s sense, these are abstract commonalities that are generally agreed upon, but the details will be interpreted differently by members of particular ethnic, cultural or religious groups. A ‘thinner’ or ‘civic’ version of national identity has been endorsed by various academics (e.g. Barry 2001; Miller 2000). The respondents in the sample, however, preferred to describe these ideas not in terms of national identity, but more in terms of personal or individual responsibilities, or as common commitments to society (Sophie, for instance, said that “I live here I like Britain, I follow the laws, I, you know, I think I have a loyalty to Britain, but as far as feeling British I can’t say it’s something I’ve ever given any thought to ‘cause it doesn’t seem that important to me”).

    This third sense of national identity (or common commitment to society) is open to all, regardless of status, heritage, or membership of an ethnic, cultural or religious group. But
    would this third possibility create the solidarity necessary for overcoming any problems stemming from diversity, the ‘politics of recognition’, and rising economic inequality ? Questions similar to this are often asked: Barry (2001, 83-4), for instance, asks whether the problem for British identity might be that “the criteria for membership in the British nation may be so undemanding as to render membership incapable of providing the foundation of common identity that is needed for the stability and justice of liberal democratic polities” and argues that there is a “sense that British nationality is a very thin glue to rely on if one is concerned about social cohesion”. Kymlicka (2008, 72), however, is more positive about the potential for ‘thin’ national identities to sustain solidarity: “In the last 40 years, we have seen a dramatic ‘thinning’ of national identities, as they have been stretched to accommodate demands for inclusion by a range of historically disadvantaged groups … At each step of this process, commentators have feared that the thinning of national identity to make it more inclusive would undermine its power to create meaningful solidarities. And yet it seems clear that thin national identities are still capable of sustaining the sort of solidarity that enables societies to adopt progressive social policies”." (pp.219-221)

    "Four main arguments about the importance of national identity for social cohesion are identified: first, a liberal concern with national identity being important because it generates the social cohesion that is necessary for the functioning of a nation’s liberal democratic institutions; second, a social democratic concern with national identity being important because it generates the social cohesion necessary for the implementation of progressive social policies; third, a communitarian concern with national identity being important for generating the social cohesion necessary for a civic culture that is able to provide citizens’ lives with context and meaning; and fourth, a conservative concern with national identity implying identification with the traditions, customs and history of national society, the cohesion of which is an important end in itself." (p.225)

    "Constitutional patriotism refers to a political commitment to a state and its institutions, but is devoid of cultural content: for proponents of constitutional patriotism, the “level of the shared political culture must be uncoupled from the level of subcultures and their prepolitical identities” (Habermas 1998, 118). Civic national identity, by contrast, is a form of national identity that is inclusive in the sense that any human being may (in theory at least) adopt it, but that has at least some cultural content, where culture is understood as referring to such things as a shared language or history, rather than a ‘political culture’ in Habermas’ (1998) sense. This can be contrasted with ethnic national identity, which includes both a commitment to the state’s institutions and legal system, and some cultural content, but the criteria for membership (or the recognition of membership) are based on descent or ethnicity.

    Sometimes the concept of a ‘civic’ national identity is used in such a way as to appear to mean something similar to the concept of constitutional patriotism, whereby it is devoid of cultural content and citizens have a mutual attachment only in that “each acknowledges the authority of a common set of laws and political institutions” (Miller 1995, 189)." (p.228)

    "What is argued is that some kind of emotional attachments between citizens are needed; “a shared affective identity that inspires … members' loyalty” (Abizadeh 2002, 496) rather than simply a commitment to a contractual arrangement. What I will argue is that the extent to which this is a problem is at least partly explained by what is meant by social unity and cohesion and the reasons why cohesion is desired. Being clear about both the type of national identity and the type of social cohesion under discussion, therefore, can go some way to resolving seemingly contradictory claims." (p.240)
    -Benjamin Richards, National identity and social cohesion: theory and evidence for British social policy, PhD thesis  submitted to the Department of Social Policy of the London School of Economics (LSE) for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy, september 2013, 337 pages.




    Dernière édition par Johnathan R. Razorback le Dim 22 Nov - 13:05, édité 2 fois


    _________________
    « La racine de toute doctrine erronée se trouve dans une erreur philosophique. [...] Le rôle des penseurs vrais, mais aussi une tâche de tout homme libre, est de comprendre les possibles conséquences de chaque principe ou idée, de chaque décision avant qu'elle se change en action, afin d'exclure aussi bien ses conséquences nuisibles que la possibilité de tromperie. »
    -Jacob Sher, Avertissement contre le socialisme, Introduction à « Tableaux de l'avenir social-démocrate » d'Eugen Richter, avril 1998.

    « La question n’est pas de constater que les gens vivent plus ou moins pauvrement, mais toujours d’une manière qui leur échappe. »
    -Guy Debord, Critique de la séparation (1961).

    Johnathan R. Razorback
    Johnathan R. Razorback
    Admin

    Messages : 7445
    Date d'inscription : 12/08/2013
    Localisation : France

    Kasper Støvring, The cultural prerequisites of social cohesion. With special attention to the nation of Denmark + Benjamin Richards, National identity and social cohesion: theory and evidence for British social policy + Neli Demireva Empty Re: Kasper Støvring, The cultural prerequisites of social cohesion. With special attention to the nation of Denmark + Benjamin Richards, National identity and social cohesion: theory and evidence for British social policy + Neli Demireva

    Message par Johnathan R. Razorback le Dim 15 Nov - 13:51

    "The theoretical considerations explored in this chapter up until now, to present an argument that the contested concept of social cohesion might be meaningfully split into two different concepts, which may be particularly advantageous when one is discussing the relationship between national identity and social cohesion. These two concepts are termed ‘institutional cohesion’ and ‘associational cohesion’." (p.243)

    "Institutional cohesion refers to relationships between individuals and public institutions, particularly with regard to the ways in which individuals have a say in influencing these institutions, and the ways in which individuals can gain access to the services they provide. A ‘cohesive society’ in this sense, then, refers to a society in which individuals feel public institutions are legitimate and can represent them, and where all individuals are able to access the services these institutions provide on an equal basis. This type of cohesion refers more to a contractual relationship between the individual and society’s institutions than any particular cultural traits.

    Associational cohesion, by contrast, refers to relationships between individuals in a society and to the ways in which individuals feel a sense of belonging as part of that society. A ‘cohesive society’ in this sense, then, refers to a society where individuals interact with each other, are engaged in civic activities with other members, feel strong senses of belonging to the society and their locality, and feel they have much in common with other members. This type of cohesion refers to cultural traits and cultural similarities between individuals." (p.243)

    "British identity may have some relevance for associational cohesion in that there are fairly consistent, positive and significant associations between British identity and each of the associational cohesion measures for several ethnic groups, and the R squared values are generally large enough for it to be less likely that the associations are spurious. However, the associations are small compared with the effect magnitudes of some of the other variables – most notably area deprivation and educational level. For institutional cohesion, by contrast, British identity may have much less relevance." (pp.247-248)

    "Institutional cohesion – referring to relationships between individuals and public institutions, including public services – has more in common with the concerns of some liberals and social democrats in terms of support for liberal democratic institutions and for the institutions of redistribution. Associational cohesion – referring to the ways in which people interact with each other and to belonging to place – has more to do with communitarian concerns with community, culture and language providing important conditions for human flourishing, or conservative concerns with the maintenance of national traditions and customs." (p.251)

    "For those of minority ethnicity but born in Britain, British identity was not correlated with any of the social cohesion measures. If the interview data in this study is anything to go by, and it is consistent in this respect with other studies (e.g. Heath and Roberts 2008), then most of minority ethnicity born in this country feel British in some form anyway, whether mildly or more strongly. And there is no evidence from this study that getting them to feel more strongly British, however that might be done, would have any positive impact on social cohesion at all." (p.266)

    "I find evidence to suggest that British identity may be of more relevance for the associational type of cohesion than the commitment type, but overall both British and English identity are of marginal relevance for social cohesion as compared to education, deprivation, and perceptions of discrimination. This suggests that attempts to use British identity as a tool to create unity and cohesion in the context of increasing diversity may not work or even be counterproductive; issues of inequality and discrimination may be much more important to address." (pp.271-272)

    "The associations that were found between national identity and social cohesion in the quantitative component are relatively very small in magnitude as compared to some of the control variables in the models. Perceived discrimination appears to be particularly strongly associated with the institutional type of social cohesion, at least when one considers equal access to public services; and education and deprivation are particularly strongly associated with the associational and belonging type of cohesion." (p.288)

    "Given that the findings from the quantitative component of this study are associations, it is not possible to give conclusive evidence either way on this debate. However, if a common sense of nationhood was a major factor in the creation of social cohesion, one would expect national identity to be strongly associated with social cohesion; yet such a strong association was not found. From this perspective, the second view – in which cohesion can be engineered or generated by rights such as equal access to the state’s institutions – appears more plausible.

    National identities were not strongly associated with the institutional type of cohesion at all ; instead of perceptions of the absence of discrimination in terms of equal access to public services were much more important. For the associational type of cohesion, education and deprivation were much more strongly associated with cohesion than British identity. What is clear from these findings is the need for further research into all the possible drivers of increased cohesion – not just a focus on national identity – the directions of causation, and the potential underlying mechanisms." (p.290)

    "Several crucial caveats must be made about the relationship between British identity and associational cohesion. [...]
    The first concerns the notion of British identity itself. Many of the government reports refer to the importance of a notion of civic identity, such as the Denham Report’s (2001, 12) reference to a “civic identity which serves to unite people and which expresses common goals and aspirations”. Yet the evidence from the qualitative component of this study suggests that British identity may, at least not yet, be considered to be a truly civic identity that is open to all. Some respondents described ways in which they felt blocked out of access to a British identity, or ways in which it was associated with particular expectations in terms of language, accent and etiquette. British identity may, as Parekh noted, still have “systematic, largely unspoken racial connotations” (2000, 38). The experiences of ‘post-colonial’ respondents, many of whom arrived in Britain with a strong sense of British identity only to find their identity was not accepted because of their skin colour, is particularly striking. As Hickman et al. (2012, 50) suggest: “One of the problems for those determined on the functionality of Britishness as a social glue is Englishness, the latter is highly significant in prescribing the possibilities and impossibilities of Britishness”. Another key issue with regard to promoting Britishness as a tool to increase social cohesion is the fact that there is evidence to suggest that the adoption of a British identity amongst white English people is less commonplace than one might expect from the community cohesion discourse, and may be less commonplace than for many non-white groups. [...] Similarly, a study by Ethnos (2005, 7) found that “the participants who identified most strongly with Britishness were those from ethnic minority backgrounds resident in England”, rather than white people. With regard to government reports and policy, particularly at issue here is the emphasis in early reports on community cohesion on certain problematised communities, with minority ethnic communities’ failure to integrate and adopt a British identity being the implied root of the issue. From this perspective, the change of emphasis in the CIC report (CIC 2007) on cohesion being something all communities should strive for is a welcome modification. If one is to use a civic notion of British identity as a tool to increase social cohesion, therefore, it may be at least as important to promote it amongst white ‘English’ people than amongst members of ethnic minority groups." (pp.301-302)

    "The third caveat refers to the finding in the quantitative component that issues of structural equality – most notably education and deprivation – may be much more important than national identity for associational cohesion. This raises the possibility that reducing structural inequalities – and also in paying attention to the distribution of structural inequalities across different ethnic groups – may be a much more beneficial policy focus for associational cohesion than a focus on British identity. For this reason, the slight shift in the Home Office’s (2005a) Improving Opportunity, Strengthening Society report towards emphasising inequalities between ethnic groups, in addition to British identity, is to be welcomed but perhaps does not go far enough. From the evidence presented here, the primary focus may need to be on inequalities, and British identity should come second." (pp.303-304)

    "There are specific policy implications in particular arising from the fact that area-level deprivation was found to be strongly associated with associational cohesion in the quantitative component. Obviously the findings were associations, so it is unclear whether there are causal relationships between deprivation and cohesion – or, for that matter, between education and cohesion." (p.304)
    -Benjamin Richards, National identity and social cohesion: theory and evidence for British social policy, PhD thesis  submitted to the Department of Social Policy of the London School of Economics (LSE) for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy, september 2013, 337 pages.




    _________________
    « La racine de toute doctrine erronée se trouve dans une erreur philosophique. [...] Le rôle des penseurs vrais, mais aussi une tâche de tout homme libre, est de comprendre les possibles conséquences de chaque principe ou idée, de chaque décision avant qu'elle se change en action, afin d'exclure aussi bien ses conséquences nuisibles que la possibilité de tromperie. »
    -Jacob Sher, Avertissement contre le socialisme, Introduction à « Tableaux de l'avenir social-démocrate » d'Eugen Richter, avril 1998.

    « La question n’est pas de constater que les gens vivent plus ou moins pauvrement, mais toujours d’une manière qui leur échappe. »
    -Guy Debord, Critique de la séparation (1961).

    Johnathan R. Razorback
    Johnathan R. Razorback
    Admin

    Messages : 7445
    Date d'inscription : 12/08/2013
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    Kasper Støvring, The cultural prerequisites of social cohesion. With special attention to the nation of Denmark + Benjamin Richards, National identity and social cohesion: theory and evidence for British social policy + Neli Demireva Empty Re: Kasper Støvring, The cultural prerequisites of social cohesion. With special attention to the nation of Denmark + Benjamin Richards, National identity and social cohesion: theory and evidence for British social policy + Neli Demireva

    Message par Johnathan R. Razorback le Dim 15 Nov - 15:33

    "Evidence from the US suggests a negative relationship.

    Frequently, the focus in social cohesion studies is on trust – generalized (whether most people can be trusted) or neighbourhood trust (most of the neighbours in this community can be trusted). Most of the empirical literature on this subject finds that the relationship between diversity and trust is negative – the more diverse a community is, the less likely individuals in it are to be trusting. The trend seems to hold especially strong for the US. Costa and Khan (2003) established with the General Social Survey that people in more diverse neighbourhoods trust their neighbours less and are less likely to be politically or communally involved. Alesina and La Ferrara (2000, 2005) found that trust in general and more specifically interpersonal trust is lower in more racially heterogeneous communities in the US. Stolle et al. (2008) comparing US and Canada observed a strong negative effect of diversity on trust; however, they also found that contact may neutralize but not make this relationship positive. Most notably, Putnam (2007) argues that diversity seems to alienate people in general and in his words pushes them towards ‘hunkering down’ i.e. towards segregation and isolation. More recently, Abascal and Baldassarri (2015) point out that diversity indices obscure the distinction between in and out-group contact. Using the same data as Putnam (2007), they show that diversity is negatively associated with trust only for white respondents but not for any other ethnic group. [...]

    The evidence from Europe and the UK is more mixed: income inequality and deprivation may be more important determinants
    Some cross-national comparative research in Europe shows similar results with trust used as a proxy for cohesiveness (Gerritsen and Lubbens 2010). However, the use of trust as the sole predictor of community spirit and togetherness has been severely criticised (Hooghe 2007) since generalized trust is but one of the components of social cohesion. Studies which focus on different dimensions of social capital besides interpersonal trust offer evidence that economic inequality and the democratic patterns in European societies are more important for explaining European countries’ different levels of social capital and cohesion (Gesthuizen et al. 2009).

    Data from British neighbourhoods also do not conform to findings from the US. Fieldhouse and Cutts (2010), comparing the US and the UK, suggested that in Britain, diversity has a negative effect on both shared social norms and civic participation, but that these negative effects are offset by the positive effect of co-ethnic concentration. In other words, areas that are more diverse have higher rates of co-ethnic density which in turn, Fieldhouse and Cutts suggest, assists the building of more cohesive communities. Laurence and Heath (2008) and Letki (2008), looking at different predictors of social cohesion in the 2005 and 2001 Citizenship Surveys, argue that there is no strong evidence for an eroding effect of diversity once the association between diversity and economic deprivation is taken into account. Still, with British data based on the Citizenship Survey 2005, Laurence (2009) argued that rising diversity is associated with lower levels of neighbourhood trust.

    The studies based on British data such as Laurence and Heath (2008), Letki (2008) and Sturgis et al. (2010) have raised the question whether it is income inequality, in particular deprivation and impoverishment of an area, rather than diversity per se that serves to estrange people, a sentiment echoed in much of the British policy research and reports based on qualitative in-depth interviews (Cantle 2005). Most recently, Sturgis et al. (2013) establish that neighbourhood ethnic diversity in London is positively related to the perceived social cohesion of neighbourhood residents with control for economic deprivation. Moreover, it is ethnic segregation within neighbourhoods that is associated with lower levels of perceived social cohesion. Both effects are strongly moderated by the age of the respondents with diversity having a positive effect for the young.

    Kawalerowicz and Biggs (2015), exploring 2011 London riots, find that rioters were more likely to come from economically disadvantaged neighbourhoods and neighbourhoods where ethnic fractionalization was high. Further exploration of the intersection between ethnicity and disadvantage is thus very pertinent.

    Some analysts have argued that contact plays an important role in moderating the relationship between diversity and cohesion. With British data based on the Citizenship Survey 2005, Laurence (2011) argued that rising diversity is associated with lower levels of neighbourhood trust, although people with “bridging ties” (i.e. ties connecting individuals belonging to different minority groups) have less negative experiences. Similarly to Abascal and Baldassari in the US (2015), Demireva and Heath (2014), using the Managing Cultural Diversity Survey 2010 (administered by the Oxford Diversity Project) and the Ethnic Minority British Election Study 2010 conclude that if anything diversity should be encouraged to cement the integration progress of migrants and foster stronger identification with Britain in the second generation as for non-white British populations living with more out-groupers does not impact negatively upon trust. Heath and Demireva (2013) establish that high levels of bonding social capital coexist with positive orientations towards integration, high levels of British identity and low levels of hostility to white people. Laurence (2014) observes that contact moderates the negative effect of community diversity – in other words for those that have formed ties, diversity has no detrimental effect. This is a result primarily focusing on the white British majority. Importantly, it seems that diversity may undermine local (neighbourhood) social capital yet has little effect on individuals’ total levels of engagement (Laurence 2014). Thus, individuals in diverse communities have less neighbourhood-centric networks but other active and healthy ones.

    There have also been calls to account for the difference between positive and negative contacts in diverse settings. The recent Casey report (2016) suggests that negative interactions can compound to create a volatile atmosphere at the neighbourhood level. With European data, Laurence and Bentley (2017) provide intriguing evidence that in more diverse communities, the frequency of positive inter-group contact but also negative inter-group contact increases. Increasing diversity may therefore lead to a polarisation in attitudes towards immigration as a result of, and not due to a lack of, inter-group contact. This research suggests a role for mediators at the community level, such as community centres that provide a non-confrontational environment for people of a variety of backgrounds and interests. Similarly the All Party Parliamentary Group on Social Inclusion (2017) argued that strong institutions are needed at the neighbourhood level to facilitate interaction (such as welcome centres).

    Datasets such as Understanding Society and the Citizenship Survey allow further examination of the role of contact in different settings: neighbourhood, workplace, voluntary associations and more research is needed in the formation and strength of inter-ethnic contacts, positive and negative. For example, Laurence et al. (2018) demonstrate that workplace diversity has a very positive effect but that individuals experiencing negative contact can diminish this trend."
    -Neli Demireva, "Immigration, Diversity and Social Cohesion", 13 décembre 2019: https://migrationobservatory.ox.ac.uk/resources/briefings/immigration-diversity-and-social-cohesion/



    _________________
    « La racine de toute doctrine erronée se trouve dans une erreur philosophique. [...] Le rôle des penseurs vrais, mais aussi une tâche de tout homme libre, est de comprendre les possibles conséquences de chaque principe ou idée, de chaque décision avant qu'elle se change en action, afin d'exclure aussi bien ses conséquences nuisibles que la possibilité de tromperie. »
    -Jacob Sher, Avertissement contre le socialisme, Introduction à « Tableaux de l'avenir social-démocrate » d'Eugen Richter, avril 1998.

    « La question n’est pas de constater que les gens vivent plus ou moins pauvrement, mais toujours d’une manière qui leur échappe. »
    -Guy Debord, Critique de la séparation (1961).

    Johnathan R. Razorback
    Johnathan R. Razorback
    Admin

    Messages : 7445
    Date d'inscription : 12/08/2013
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    Kasper Støvring, The cultural prerequisites of social cohesion. With special attention to the nation of Denmark + Benjamin Richards, National identity and social cohesion: theory and evidence for British social policy + Neli Demireva Empty Re: Kasper Støvring, The cultural prerequisites of social cohesion. With special attention to the nation of Denmark + Benjamin Richards, National identity and social cohesion: theory and evidence for British social policy + Neli Demireva

    Message par Johnathan R. Razorback le Dim 22 Nov - 13:05

    "Well-documented knowledge exists about Denmark and the Danes, which can be summarized as follows: there is a widespread solidarity and positive national emotions are strong; the country is culturally homogenous; peace and safety reigns; there are very high levels of trust, prosperity, and freedom; the state is characterized by a low level of corruption ; and the Danes are very content with their lives. In sociology, the attempt to achieve such a high level of cohesion is sometimes expressed as “the problem of getting to Denmark” (Fukuyama, 2011). However, cohesion cannot be and has not been the result of mere institution building: it is also a matter of culture, and this article deals with the part of social cohesion that depends on culture. In other words, there are specific cultural prerequisites for social cohesion, and these can be found in a nation such as Denmark." (p.134)

    "There is a worldwide modern trend that seeks to weaken national culture and instead build countries on purely political and legal foundations, which is particularly evident in the adoption of governmental welfare schemes, transnational systems, and conventions. While the cultural trend is primarily a popular trend, the political trend is more elitist and mainly represented by people from the media, the universities, and large parts of the political system." (p.136)

    "One of the most striking manifestations of the elitist, political attempt to bind society together through formal norms is the idea of constitutional patriotism and the constant emphasis on democratic principles – “democratism” to use a slightly polemical term. Hence, the launch of a “democratic canon”, which in Denmark was proposed in 2006 by the historian Ove Korsgaard as an alternative to the “national cultural canon”, which had been presented by Minister of Cultural Affairs, Brian Mikkelsen, a year earlier. Korsgaard and supporters of democratism argue that in a modern multicultural society, citizens neither can nor shall become united in a particular national culture. Instead, citizens should submit to and unite under the constitution and the overarching system of governance : democracy is understood as a mere political system based on universal values such as tolerance, freedom, and equality. It is not acknowledged that democracy requires the existence of a certain type of national culture in order to take root. Ove Korsgaard is just one among several academics, opinion makers, and politicians who want to dismantle Danish national culture and replace it with top-down political values. Let us examine in more detail this “post-national” theory, which has been supported with the greatest intellectual impact by the German left-liberal Philosopher Jürgen Habermas.

    According to post-national theory, it no longer makes sense to talk about a national identity that is simply “given” in advance and that also determines our identity as citizens of a liberal state. Supporters of post-national theory want citizens to be deliberately selective in their choice of allegiance, whereby any affiliation can be defended or refuted through critical arguments. Membership can be freely chosen ; some would even say that identity and associations can be freely constructed. In a modern liberal democracy, we are expected to attach to and identify, not with what one might call a romantic culture nation, that is, a community based on common language, history, origin, religion, customs, and artworks that are canonized in the “national cultural canon”; rather, we must identify with the political order, the constitution, and the rule of law. Supporters of post-national theory are, in fact, moving away from the idea of a nation as something concrete, something distinct, something particular; they are replacing it with universal and abstract ideas of democracy and human rights." (p.137)

    "To be integrated in society is therefore merely a question of not breaking the law. In other words, any underlying subjective motivation and sentiment is of no consequence and, furthermore, it is of no importance whether citizens value all or certain aspects of the culture of their country. In the case of Denmark, citizens can, within the confines of the law, have distinct anti-national loyalties. They can express sympathy for Iraqi insurgents killing Danish soldiers or support a fatwa issued by Muslim scholars from the Middle East when the Danish legal system goes against them in matters of freedom of speech (notably, the drawing and printing of the caricatures of the Islamic prophet Mohammed). They may have views on matters such as freedom of religion, minority rights, or equality of women that are contrary to the traditional Danish view." (p.138)

    "It is the welfare state that loses legitimacy as society becomes more and more fragmented due to multiculturalism, and social cohesion fades away (Cini and Rosenløv, 2004; Putnam, 2007; Christensen, 2010)." (p.139)

    "The high level of trust has also been measured statistically; the Danes have an active community life, high political participation, and a low level of social dysfunction in terms of crime, litigation, nepotism, and corruption (Gundelach, 2004, 2011). The Danes are also a relatively culturally homogeneous people as demonstrated by the demographics expert Hans Kornø Rasmussen (who even talks about “the Danish tribe”), and they have a positive sense of national identity (the Danes are, when asked, proud of being Danish)." (p.140)

    "We are dealing with complex layers of unconscious assumptions, unwritten rules, spontaneously generated moral values, implicit modes of communication (including irony and satire) and tacit knowledge, which have the character of a sedimentary formation. In short, we are dealing with informal norms, which are strong in a popular community such as Denmark." (p.141)

    "A culture not only has a common vocabulary, but also common phrases, gestures, facial expressions and customs, which also work as signals of intention. Because we are familiar with our own culture, we are better able to distinguish between those who wish to help and those who wish to cheat. Culture also passes on certain rules of behaviour that make an individual’s actions more predictable." (p.143)

    "We must again bear in mind that a democratic order, when framed in the context of an abstract and universalist notion of constitutional patriotism, remains only a formal norm. It can hardly satisfy the emotional needs of belonging to a substantial community, a nation with a defined popular culture. Citizens must also have feelings toward the state, reason is not enough: the failure of the EU project may once again provide evidence of the need for a sense of attachment." (p.145)

    "Principles alone do not unite the state and the people. This is the main cultural conservative objection to the post-national theory: a democracy does not float in thin air. It must be anchored in a culture with common norms so that formal democratic values can become internalised as expressions of a common national community." (p.145)

    "There is no consensus that the preservation of cohesion requires cultural integration. This lack of agreement is apparent in the Danish debate on whether immigrants should become familiar with the country’s core culture and “feel Danish” in order to achieve citizenship. Opponents of the official naturalization tests argue that to be Danish is a purely formal matter; you must obey the laws and recognize democratic principles and human rights. In this case they have an advantage on both the theoretical and rhetorical level because it is very difficult to conceptualize national identity and national sentiments, precisely because they are often unarticulated, implicit, and unconscious. This is also the case with the informal norms that are essential for establishing a civic culture of cohesion. But opponents of the naturalization test have not much historical evidence to support their point of view." (p.146)

    "The challenge is therefore to conceptualize the informal norms and the world views, values, virtues and patterns of behaviour that characterize the kind of culture that has prerequisites of social cohesion strong, positive cohesion." (pp.146-147)
    -Kasper Støvring, "The cultural prerequisites of social cohesion. With special attention to the nation of Denmark", International Journal of Sociology and Social Policy, Volume 32 (3/4): 19 – Apr 20, 2012: https://www.deepdyve.com/lp/emerald-publishing/the-cultural-prerequisites-of-social-cohesion-with-special-attention-kTr46bXl1t



    _________________
    « La racine de toute doctrine erronée se trouve dans une erreur philosophique. [...] Le rôle des penseurs vrais, mais aussi une tâche de tout homme libre, est de comprendre les possibles conséquences de chaque principe ou idée, de chaque décision avant qu'elle se change en action, afin d'exclure aussi bien ses conséquences nuisibles que la possibilité de tromperie. »
    -Jacob Sher, Avertissement contre le socialisme, Introduction à « Tableaux de l'avenir social-démocrate » d'Eugen Richter, avril 1998.

    « La question n’est pas de constater que les gens vivent plus ou moins pauvrement, mais toujours d’une manière qui leur échappe. »
    -Guy Debord, Critique de la séparation (1961).

    Johnathan R. Razorback
    Johnathan R. Razorback
    Admin

    Messages : 7445
    Date d'inscription : 12/08/2013
    Localisation : France

    Kasper Støvring, The cultural prerequisites of social cohesion. With special attention to the nation of Denmark + Benjamin Richards, National identity and social cohesion: theory and evidence for British social policy + Neli Demireva Empty Re: Kasper Støvring, The cultural prerequisites of social cohesion. With special attention to the nation of Denmark + Benjamin Richards, National identity and social cohesion: theory and evidence for British social policy + Neli Demireva

    Message par Johnathan R. Razorback le Dim 22 Nov - 14:41

    https://sci-hub.ren/10.1177/0010414012453033

    "There is a growing consensus in a number of different literatures that national identity can facilitate social cohesion. According to David Miller (1995, p. 140; also see Miller, 2000), one of the strongest proponents of this argument, national identity increases the likelihood that people will place trust in their fellow citizens: “Trust requires solidarity not merely within groups but across them, and this in turn depends upon a common identification of the kind that nationality alone can provide.” According to Will Kymlicka (2001, p. 225), this kind of trust is essential because it encourages us to make sacrifices for “anonymous others whom we do not know, will probably never meet, and whose ethnic descent, religion and way of life differs from our own.” The central premise is that a common shared identity functions as a category superordinate to ethnic, religious, or linguistic ties and can function as a kind of glue that holds society together." (p.155)

    "Social capital is more abundant in economically affluent societies (Delhey & Newton, 2005; Hooghe et al., 2009; Inglehart, 1997)." (p.161)

    "Civic nationalism appears to increase with social capital, whereas the opposite appears to be true with ethnic nationalism." (p.162)

    "Civic nationalists are not more likely to volunteer; but they are more likely to think that most people can be trusted, and also to be a member of an association.
    And so, as our extension of Miller’s basic argument would suggest, people endorsing an exclusionary view of nationhood, for example by premising full membership in the national community on an ascriptive blood tie, appear to also be less trusting. Moreover, although Miller’s focus is on trust, this effect also extends to the willingness to participate and volunteer. By contrast, endorsing an inclusionary view on citizenship, one that privileges good citizenship over blood, appears to foster a more trusting outlook. The question that remains is the extent to which doing so also makes it less likely that one will “hunker down” in the face of diversity." (pp.165-166)

    "We confirm the recent finding that, at least in Europe, immigrant diversity at the national level erodes social capital only weakly (Gesthuizen et al., 2009; Hooghe et al., 2009; Kesler & Bloemraad, 2010). The regression parameters—indicating a negative but nonsignificant effect parameter on both generalized trust and associational membership but, of interest, positive and nonsignificant parameter on volunteering—largely support this." (p.166)

    "In contrast to expectations, individuals living in countries in which the general population endorses a civic logic toward nationhood are not more likely to express generalized trust or be civically active (Model 2). In addition, Model 3 of Table 3 shows that H3 finds little support: Living in a diverse nation premised on civic nationalism does not appear to encourage social capital at the individual level. The main effects of ethnic nationalism on social capital (Model 4 of Table 3) are, on the other hand, more pronounced.11 In countries more strongly premised on ethnic nationalism, trust and civic engagement are reduced." (p.166)

    "As Models 2 and 4 indicate, the results for civic nationalism (H5) are mixed. In terms of generalized trust, it seems that a positive main effect of civic nationalism is combined with a significant negative interaction effect between civic nationalism and the share of immigrants. This significant effect does, however, fade when adding the cross-level interaction between diversity and ethnic nationalism on trust (Model 4). Thus, counter to expectations, it appears that civic conceptions of national identity do not cushion one’s sensitivity to immigrant diversity. On the other hand, the results are rather different for volunteering, where a nonsignificant positive main effect of civic nationalism is combined with a positive interaction, meaning that civic nationalism has a positive impact on the effect of diversity on the odds of volunteering in at least one association. This significant interaction term holds when controlling for the cross-level diversity–ethnic nationalism interaction (Model 4). For being a member of any associations, only significant main effects without significant interactions are apparent." (p.169)

    "At the individual level, the moderating effect of civic nationalism appears to depend on the indicator: It heightens the weakly positive effect of diversity on associational membership as expected, but, counter to expectations, it also appears to exacerbate the weakly negative effect of diversity on generalized trust." (p.170)
    -Tim Reeskens and Matthew Wright, "Nationalism and the Cohesive Society: A Multilevel Analysis of the Interplay Among Diversity, National Identity, and Social Capital Across 27 European Societies", Comparative Political Studies 2013 46: 153 originally published online 21 August 2012.

    https://sci-hub.ren/10.1017/s1755773916000266

    "Nationalists suggest that sharing a national culture is required for (sufficient levels of) trust and solidarity, liberals that we need only share a commitment to some basic liberal principles of justice, whereas multiculturalists suggest that we need to share a commitment to the recognition of difference. We shall refer to such value-sets as ‘community values’, as they are values thought to bind community members together in ways that are conducive to social cohesion. Such specific sets we shall refer to as ‘nationalist community values’, ‘multicultural community values’, etc. to highlight their basis in specific political doctrines. Nationalist community values, then, are the values nationalist political theorists consider necessary for social cohesion at adequate levels, etc.

    In this article, we empirically investigate the claim that community values form a basis for social cohesion – a claim assumed in the argument for why redistribution relies on such values. More specifically, we investigate a particular way in which community values may impact social cohesion, namely the idea that commitments to specific shared values tend to increase social cohesion at the individual level. This idea is at the heart of the national identity argument. On the basis of a survey conducted in Denmark in 2014, we study the correlation between, on the on hand, commitments to the community values of respectively conservative nationalism, liberal nationalism, liberal citizenship, and multiculturalism, and on the other, trust and solidarity. This does not allow us to draw conclusions about causal directions in the correlations we find. Nevertheless, when, for example, nationalists hypothesize that a commitment to the national culture will tend to increase trust and solidarity among co-nationals (Miller, 1995: Chs 4, 5), this gives rise to an expectation that individuals who have such commitments will exhibit higher levels of trust and solidarity toward co-nationals than individuals who do not." (p.2)

    "The question of whether certain community values or shared identities impact trust and solidarity has received very limited attention. [...] the impact of national identity on social cohesion has only been tested in a few studies (Citrin et al., 2001; Martinez-Herrera, 2004, 2010; Shayo, 2009; Theiss‐Morse, 2009; Johnston et al., 2010; Wright and Reeskens, 2013). Whether a national identity can actually serve the assumed function is therefore very much an open question." (p.3)

    "The results from the handful of studies testing the national identity argument are rather inconclusive and contradictory (Miller and Ali, 2014: 2). In one of the few cross-national studies testing this argument, Shayo (2009) finds not only a negative correlation between national identification (measured as national pride) and support for redistribution at the individual level, but also a strong negative correlation between national identification and levels of actual redistribution on the country level. In a Canadian study in which national identity is measured as‘closeness’ to the nation, Johnston et al. (2010) find partial support for the argument put forward by liberal nationalists, as ‘national identity contributes to a sense of belonging and solidarity that transcends economic interest and cultural differences’, but only when it comes to certain sub-domains of the welfare state (Johnston et al., 2010: 350). A British study calls the liberal nationalist hypothesis into question as it finds no impact of national identification (measured as ‘support for the political community’) on support for the welfare state (Martinez-Herrera, 2004). Furthermore, a couple of US studies find that national identity at the individual level has no significant impact on beliefs about social justice in terms of spending on health, education, and welfare (Citrin et al., 2001; Theiss-Morse, 2009)." (p.4)

    "Liberal nationalists share with conservative nationalists the commitment to a national culture, insisting that, for example, trust ‘is much more likely to exist among people who share a common national identity, speak a common language, and have overlapping values’ (Miller, 1998: 48). However, liberal nationalists suggest that national identities are not static but transformed over time and need to be sufficiently open so that, for example, immigrants can realistically access them. Furthermore, they stress the importance of a shared commitment to liberal political structures as a basis for social cohesion (Miller, 1995: Chs 4, 5; Kymlicka, 2001: 258). This means that there are aspects of national cultures that liberal and conservative nationalists may disagree about; for example, liberal nationalists may be wary of including a particular religion in the national identity (Miller, 1995: 92), whereas conservative nationalists may be more inclined to do so." (p.6)

    "The general pattern is that conservative and liberal nationalism are negatively associated with trust (except for trust in people of Danish origin), whereas the opposite is true of liberal citizenship and (in particular) multiculturalism." (p.11)

    "Liberal nationalists are significantly more trusting and solidaristic across all measures than conservative nationalists." (p.15)

    "Both conservative and liberal nationalism is negatively correlated to trust and solidarity. [...]  Lower levels of trust in – and solidarity with – immigrants may reflect that respondents attracted to nationalism tend not to see immigrants as co-nationals. What is perhaps more worrying for proponents of the national identity argument is that not even in-group trust and solidarity seem to be positively impacted by commitments to the cultural nation." (p.18)

    "It is striking that multiculturalist respondents not only have higher levels of trust in immigrants than nationalist respondents (which may have been expected), but also have higher levels of trust in people of Danish origin. To some extent, the positive relationship between multicultural values and trust and solidarity challenges a worry that has been articulated by a number of theorists, namely that multiculturalism drives down social cohesion by emphasizing difference at the expense of commonalities between citizens." (p.18)
    -Karen N. Breidahl & Nils Holtug & Kristian Kongshøj, "Do shared values promote social cohesion ? If so, which ? Evidence from Denmark", European Political Science Review, Volume 10, Numéro 1, Février 2018, pp. 97-118.





    _________________
    « La racine de toute doctrine erronée se trouve dans une erreur philosophique. [...] Le rôle des penseurs vrais, mais aussi une tâche de tout homme libre, est de comprendre les possibles conséquences de chaque principe ou idée, de chaque décision avant qu'elle se change en action, afin d'exclure aussi bien ses conséquences nuisibles que la possibilité de tromperie. »
    -Jacob Sher, Avertissement contre le socialisme, Introduction à « Tableaux de l'avenir social-démocrate » d'Eugen Richter, avril 1998.

    « La question n’est pas de constater que les gens vivent plus ou moins pauvrement, mais toujours d’une manière qui leur échappe. »
    -Guy Debord, Critique de la séparation (1961).


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    Kasper Støvring, The cultural prerequisites of social cohesion. With special attention to the nation of Denmark + Benjamin Richards, National identity and social cohesion: theory and evidence for British social policy + Neli Demireva Empty Re: Kasper Støvring, The cultural prerequisites of social cohesion. With special attention to the nation of Denmark + Benjamin Richards, National identity and social cohesion: theory and evidence for British social policy + Neli Demireva

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