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https://archive.org/details/introductiontopr0000grac/page/n5/mode/2up
"One of the recurring problems discussed by contemporary philosophers is the problem of individuation. Both in the Analytic tradition and in Continental philosophy, important thinkers have been puzzled by the issues surrounding individuality: its nature, causal explanation and its relation to many other philosophical notions. This interest, moreover, has turned their attention to early modern, medieval and classical views on the subject. In particular, attention is being paid to late scholastic figures such as Thomas Aquinas, Duns Scotus and William of Ockham. Nonetheless, little has been done to develop a comprehensive understanding of the problem, the reason why it concerned scholastics in particular, and the basic differences between the medieval approaches and the contemporary ones. The result has often been confusion and misunderstanding. Moroever, nothing has been done with the early and formative period of the Middle Ages, which extends from Boethius to the time just before the impact of the translation from Arabic was felt. Yet, it is at this period that the framework for future discussions is developped, having as a result a substantive importance for the historical understanding of what comes later." (p.11)
"Early medieval discussions of individuation make no mention as a general rule of ancien Greek authors except for Aristotle and Plato, whom they knew largely second hand. Greek authors could hardly have been used since there were pratically no latin translations of their works and early medieval writers, except for very few such as John Eriugena, knew no Greek." (p.13)
"Boethius' texts, including the key passages from Porphyry and Aristotle he translated, constitute the historical origin and source of all subsequent discussion of individuation until the translation from Arabic begin to appear in the latter part of the twelfth century." (p.13)
"Perhaps the most immediate metaphysical intuition that human being have about the world is that it is composed of individual entities, which (a) lose their fundamental character if they are divided into parts, (b) are distinct from all other entities, even from those that are of their same specific kind, (c) are one of a group type of class which has or can have several members, (d) remain the same through time and various changes, and (e) are not predicated of other things. The first point is quite obvious in the case of some natural beings. The first point is quite obvious in the case of some natural beings. A man, for instance Socrates, if divided into parts, ceases to be a man, and the man he is, Socrates, if divided into parts, ceases to be a man, and the man he is, Socrate, and becomes a collection of inert limbs. But even in the case of artifacts it is also quite evident, for a table broken up into pieces is no table at all. The second point seems also a basic datum of our experience, for each of these particular entities that compose the world with which we are acquainted seems unique and distinct in some way from everything else. True, Socrates is, like Aristotle, a man and philosopher to boot ; but they are distinct, separate beings. The same can be said about the table on which i am writing these words or even, some philosophers argued, about the color and other characteristics of such a table. A similar case can be made for the third, fourth and fifth points. Socrates is one within the group of all men and the same could be said about the table or its brown color. Indeed, even if all tables were destroyed but one, the remaining table would be one within the group of all possible tables ; that group would include the real table and all other tables, past and future. Also intuitively obvious if that Socrates endures and that he is not predicable of other beings. It cannot be said of Aristotle that he is Socrates -unless, of course, Socrates and Aristotle are the same man, in which case there is no real predication, but an identity.
Now, what makes these intuitions the subject of philosophical reflection and interest is not just their immediacy, but their possible conflicts. For exemple, if the philosopher takes sameness or similarity among things as basic, namely, that they seem to belong to a group or class distinct from other groups or classes, how does he explain the uniqueness of each of the members of the class ? But, on the other hand, if he takes individuality as fundamental, how does he explain the individual's similarity with other individuals ? Likewise, how can the philosopher explain the individual's apparent inability to be divided and remain the same, or its capacity to endure through time and change ? Or how is he to explain the epistemic criteria used in distinguishing individuals from each other ?" (pp.17-18)
"Terms such as "individuation", "individuality", "numerical unity", "numerical diversity", "distinction", "sameness", "difference", and a score of others are frequently used but their meanings seldom explained. A second and no less important source of misunderstanding is the mistaken assumption that there is only one philosophical problem connected with individuality. For some this is the problem of finding the cause or principle of individuation ; for others it is the problem of finding acceptable criteria to determine individuality. In both cases they omit consideration of some of the most basic issues surrounding this notion.
Our task here, then, is to clarify the terminology of individuation and to distinguish the various issues which surround it." (p.18)
"It is common experience that when thinking about an individual, concrete thing such as a mean, or a tree, one may consider those features that the thing has or seems to have in common with other things, or alternatively, those features that are peculiar or unique to the thing under consideration. The features that are common to the thing and other things are usually referred to as the thing's "nature". In turn the nature can be specific, generic or accidental. The specific nature consists of the common features which are part of what distinguishes the thing from a larger group or a kind of things and at the same time makes it part of a smaller group of things, the members of which can be distinguished only in terms of individual features. One such specific feature, for exemple, may be the capacity to reason in man. The features that all members of several species have in common and which make them belong to a larger group which is in turn distinct from other larger groups, constitute the genus or generic nature. Both generic and psecific features are essential to the thing [...] they are necessary conditions of its kind and existence. A man for example, is not a man and connot exist as a man if he does not have the capacity to reason (specific feature) and a body (generic feature). The features which a thing may or may not have, and thus are not necessary conditions for its kind or existence, are usually called "accidental". The brown color of a man"s hair, for exemple, is an accidental nature to him.
On the other hand, those features that set a thing apart from all other things, including those falling together with it into a group, constitue the thing's "individuality". In both the case of the nature and individuality the content of the thought involved when one thinks about them seems to be different. Take, for example, the case of Peter. A consideration of his, say, specific nature, focuses on his humanity, that is, the group of features such as rationality, capacity of laugh, etc., that make him human and which render him both indistinguisable from other human beings and distinguishable from non-human beings such as dogs, tress and rocks. A consideration of Peter's individuality, on the other hand, will focus only on that feature or group of features which separate Peter from Paul and any other individual being, whether human or not. In the first case we think of how and in what respects Peter is the same as others, in the second of how and in what respects Peter is unique. The cluster of philosophical issues concerned with natures go by the generic name, "the problem of the universals", those concerned with individulity are usually gathered under the term "the problem of individuation". The latter is the subject of our inquiry. [...]
The terme "individuation" is used in the literature for two things: (1) the process by which an individual acquires the feature or features which make it the individual it is, or (2) the very feature or features which render it such." (pp.18-19)
-Jorge J. E. Garcia, Introduction to the problem of individuation in the early Middle Ages, The Catholic University of America Press, Washington, D.C., 1984, 302 pages.
"One of the recurring problems discussed by contemporary philosophers is the problem of individuation. Both in the Analytic tradition and in Continental philosophy, important thinkers have been puzzled by the issues surrounding individuality: its nature, causal explanation and its relation to many other philosophical notions. This interest, moreover, has turned their attention to early modern, medieval and classical views on the subject. In particular, attention is being paid to late scholastic figures such as Thomas Aquinas, Duns Scotus and William of Ockham. Nonetheless, little has been done to develop a comprehensive understanding of the problem, the reason why it concerned scholastics in particular, and the basic differences between the medieval approaches and the contemporary ones. The result has often been confusion and misunderstanding. Moroever, nothing has been done with the early and formative period of the Middle Ages, which extends from Boethius to the time just before the impact of the translation from Arabic was felt. Yet, it is at this period that the framework for future discussions is developped, having as a result a substantive importance for the historical understanding of what comes later." (p.11)
"Early medieval discussions of individuation make no mention as a general rule of ancien Greek authors except for Aristotle and Plato, whom they knew largely second hand. Greek authors could hardly have been used since there were pratically no latin translations of their works and early medieval writers, except for very few such as John Eriugena, knew no Greek." (p.13)
"Boethius' texts, including the key passages from Porphyry and Aristotle he translated, constitute the historical origin and source of all subsequent discussion of individuation until the translation from Arabic begin to appear in the latter part of the twelfth century." (p.13)
"Perhaps the most immediate metaphysical intuition that human being have about the world is that it is composed of individual entities, which (a) lose their fundamental character if they are divided into parts, (b) are distinct from all other entities, even from those that are of their same specific kind, (c) are one of a group type of class which has or can have several members, (d) remain the same through time and various changes, and (e) are not predicated of other things. The first point is quite obvious in the case of some natural beings. The first point is quite obvious in the case of some natural beings. A man, for instance Socrates, if divided into parts, ceases to be a man, and the man he is, Socrates, if divided into parts, ceases to be a man, and the man he is, Socrate, and becomes a collection of inert limbs. But even in the case of artifacts it is also quite evident, for a table broken up into pieces is no table at all. The second point seems also a basic datum of our experience, for each of these particular entities that compose the world with which we are acquainted seems unique and distinct in some way from everything else. True, Socrates is, like Aristotle, a man and philosopher to boot ; but they are distinct, separate beings. The same can be said about the table on which i am writing these words or even, some philosophers argued, about the color and other characteristics of such a table. A similar case can be made for the third, fourth and fifth points. Socrates is one within the group of all men and the same could be said about the table or its brown color. Indeed, even if all tables were destroyed but one, the remaining table would be one within the group of all possible tables ; that group would include the real table and all other tables, past and future. Also intuitively obvious if that Socrates endures and that he is not predicable of other beings. It cannot be said of Aristotle that he is Socrates -unless, of course, Socrates and Aristotle are the same man, in which case there is no real predication, but an identity.
Now, what makes these intuitions the subject of philosophical reflection and interest is not just their immediacy, but their possible conflicts. For exemple, if the philosopher takes sameness or similarity among things as basic, namely, that they seem to belong to a group or class distinct from other groups or classes, how does he explain the uniqueness of each of the members of the class ? But, on the other hand, if he takes individuality as fundamental, how does he explain the individual's similarity with other individuals ? Likewise, how can the philosopher explain the individual's apparent inability to be divided and remain the same, or its capacity to endure through time and change ? Or how is he to explain the epistemic criteria used in distinguishing individuals from each other ?" (pp.17-18)
"Terms such as "individuation", "individuality", "numerical unity", "numerical diversity", "distinction", "sameness", "difference", and a score of others are frequently used but their meanings seldom explained. A second and no less important source of misunderstanding is the mistaken assumption that there is only one philosophical problem connected with individuality. For some this is the problem of finding the cause or principle of individuation ; for others it is the problem of finding acceptable criteria to determine individuality. In both cases they omit consideration of some of the most basic issues surrounding this notion.
Our task here, then, is to clarify the terminology of individuation and to distinguish the various issues which surround it." (p.18)
"It is common experience that when thinking about an individual, concrete thing such as a mean, or a tree, one may consider those features that the thing has or seems to have in common with other things, or alternatively, those features that are peculiar or unique to the thing under consideration. The features that are common to the thing and other things are usually referred to as the thing's "nature". In turn the nature can be specific, generic or accidental. The specific nature consists of the common features which are part of what distinguishes the thing from a larger group or a kind of things and at the same time makes it part of a smaller group of things, the members of which can be distinguished only in terms of individual features. One such specific feature, for exemple, may be the capacity to reason in man. The features that all members of several species have in common and which make them belong to a larger group which is in turn distinct from other larger groups, constitute the genus or generic nature. Both generic and psecific features are essential to the thing [...] they are necessary conditions of its kind and existence. A man for example, is not a man and connot exist as a man if he does not have the capacity to reason (specific feature) and a body (generic feature). The features which a thing may or may not have, and thus are not necessary conditions for its kind or existence, are usually called "accidental". The brown color of a man"s hair, for exemple, is an accidental nature to him.
On the other hand, those features that set a thing apart from all other things, including those falling together with it into a group, constitue the thing's "individuality". In both the case of the nature and individuality the content of the thought involved when one thinks about them seems to be different. Take, for example, the case of Peter. A consideration of his, say, specific nature, focuses on his humanity, that is, the group of features such as rationality, capacity of laugh, etc., that make him human and which render him both indistinguisable from other human beings and distinguishable from non-human beings such as dogs, tress and rocks. A consideration of Peter's individuality, on the other hand, will focus only on that feature or group of features which separate Peter from Paul and any other individual being, whether human or not. In the first case we think of how and in what respects Peter is the same as others, in the second of how and in what respects Peter is unique. The cluster of philosophical issues concerned with natures go by the generic name, "the problem of the universals", those concerned with individulity are usually gathered under the term "the problem of individuation". The latter is the subject of our inquiry. [...]
The terme "individuation" is used in the literature for two things: (1) the process by which an individual acquires the feature or features which make it the individual it is, or (2) the very feature or features which render it such." (pp.18-19)
-Jorge J. E. Garcia, Introduction to the problem of individuation in the early Middle Ages, The Catholic University of America Press, Washington, D.C., 1984, 302 pages.
