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https://fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/David_M._Armstrong
"In the past, there seemed to be two great objections to giving a purely physical account of man. In the first place, man had a property which he shared with animals and plants, but which ordinary material objects lacked: he was alive. Could life be nothing but a purely physical property ? In the second place, man had a property which he shared with many animals, but with nothing else in the physical world : he has a mind. He perceived, felt, thought and had purposes. Could mentality be nothing but a purely phyisal property ?
Increasing scientific knowledge had largely answered the first objection. It is now very probable, even if not certain, that life is a purely physico-chemical phenomenon. We do not need to postulate "vegatative souls" or "vital entelechies" to explain life. What of the second objection ? More and more psychologists and neurophysiologists explicitly or implicitly accept the view that, so far as mental processes are concerned, there is no need to postulate anything but purely physical processes in man's central nervous system. If we take the word "mind" to mean "that in which mental processes occur" or "that which has mental states", then we can put this view briefly and not too misleadingly as : the mind is nothing but the brain. If scientific progress sustains this view, it seems that man is nothing but a material object having none but phyiscal properties." (p.1)
"There is no valid philosophical or logical reasons for rejecting the identification of mind and brain. Like John Locke, i conceive my task negatively. I am an underlabourer carting away rubbish from the path along which i conceive, or guess, that scientific progress lies." (p.2)
" [Chapter I - A classification of theories of mind]
"Some theories of mind and body try to reduce body to mind or some property of mind. Such theories may be called Mentalist theories. Thus according to Hegel and his followers, the Absolute Idealists, the whole material world is really mental or spiritual in nature, little as it may appear so. According to Leibniz, material objects are colonies of rudimentary souls. These are both mentalist theories. It may be plausibly argued that Bishop Berkeley and his philosophical descendants the Phenomenalists, who hold that physical objects are constructions out of "ideas" or sense-impressions, are putting forward mentalist theories of matter.
In opposition to these mentalist theories, we have Materalist theories which try to reduce mind to body or to some property of body.
Between mentalist and materialist theories we find two sorts of compromise theories. In the first place, there are Dualist theories which treat mind and matter as two independant sorts of things. In the second place, we have theories like Spinoza's which treat mind and matter as diffrent attributes of the same underlying stuff, or Neutral Monism, which holds that mind and matter are different arrangements of a single sort of stuff." (p.5)
-David. M. Armstrong, A Materialist Theory of the Mind, London / New York, Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1968, 372 pages.
"In the past, there seemed to be two great objections to giving a purely physical account of man. In the first place, man had a property which he shared with animals and plants, but which ordinary material objects lacked: he was alive. Could life be nothing but a purely physical property ? In the second place, man had a property which he shared with many animals, but with nothing else in the physical world : he has a mind. He perceived, felt, thought and had purposes. Could mentality be nothing but a purely phyisal property ?
Increasing scientific knowledge had largely answered the first objection. It is now very probable, even if not certain, that life is a purely physico-chemical phenomenon. We do not need to postulate "vegatative souls" or "vital entelechies" to explain life. What of the second objection ? More and more psychologists and neurophysiologists explicitly or implicitly accept the view that, so far as mental processes are concerned, there is no need to postulate anything but purely physical processes in man's central nervous system. If we take the word "mind" to mean "that in which mental processes occur" or "that which has mental states", then we can put this view briefly and not too misleadingly as : the mind is nothing but the brain. If scientific progress sustains this view, it seems that man is nothing but a material object having none but phyiscal properties." (p.1)
"There is no valid philosophical or logical reasons for rejecting the identification of mind and brain. Like John Locke, i conceive my task negatively. I am an underlabourer carting away rubbish from the path along which i conceive, or guess, that scientific progress lies." (p.2)
" [Chapter I - A classification of theories of mind]
"Some theories of mind and body try to reduce body to mind or some property of mind. Such theories may be called Mentalist theories. Thus according to Hegel and his followers, the Absolute Idealists, the whole material world is really mental or spiritual in nature, little as it may appear so. According to Leibniz, material objects are colonies of rudimentary souls. These are both mentalist theories. It may be plausibly argued that Bishop Berkeley and his philosophical descendants the Phenomenalists, who hold that physical objects are constructions out of "ideas" or sense-impressions, are putting forward mentalist theories of matter.
In opposition to these mentalist theories, we have Materalist theories which try to reduce mind to body or to some property of body.
Between mentalist and materialist theories we find two sorts of compromise theories. In the first place, there are Dualist theories which treat mind and matter as two independant sorts of things. In the second place, we have theories like Spinoza's which treat mind and matter as diffrent attributes of the same underlying stuff, or Neutral Monism, which holds that mind and matter are different arrangements of a single sort of stuff." (p.5)
-David. M. Armstrong, A Materialist Theory of the Mind, London / New York, Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1968, 372 pages.
