Accueil
https://cloudflare-ipfs.com/ipfs/bafykbzacealdzslotsko54ifxhx332om7etovi7cvfiynjp5fcnyuixlsfo42?filename=%28Cultural%20Memory%20in%20the%20Present%29%20Knox%20Peden%20-%20Spinoza%20Contra%20Phenomenology_%20French%20Rationalism%20from%20Cavaill%C3%A8s%20to%20Deleuze-Stanford%20University%20Press%20%282014%29.pdf
"Since Desanti was uneasy with the tendency among his classmates to identify with one hero along the “royal way” of philosophy being offered by Brunschvicg at the time -be it Plato, Descartes, Spinoza, or, most popularly, Kant—Cavaillès’s more narrow and technical focus on “logistics” allowed Desanti to remain uncommitted even as he developed an early expertise in a field otherwise marginalized in the French context." (p.96)
"Desanti found that Spinoza had already taken each and every step the only way it could be taken in his unique philosophical system. Unlike mathematical reasoning, which affords a plurality of routes and ways to achieve the same rational conclusions, Spinoza’s strictness was in extremis and eliminated any wandering from the set path. Nevertheless, Spinoza’s commitment to rationalism would mark Desanti indelibly ; this commitment remained a clear feature of Desanti’s thought for the rest of his career. In 1935, Maurice Merleau-Ponty replaced Cavaillès as caïman, the instructor charged with preparing students at the ENS for the agrégation in philosophy. Shortly after his arrival, he charged Desanti with the task of preparing a presentation on the subject of the “immediate.” The result of this experience was decisive for Desanti’s own intellectual development." (p.96)
"A talk titled “Spinoza and Phenomenology” that Desanti delivered in 1990 at a Sorbonne symposium on Spinoza and the twentieth century. The talk’s contents are a protracted “thought experiment” in which Desanti seeks to account for the silence over Spinoza in evidence among the “Masters of Phenomenology.” Playing the role of an “impenitent phenomenologist,” Desanti tries to “effectuate the sense” of Spinoza’s key phrase from the Treatise on the Emendation of the Intellect: habemus enim ideam verum (roughly, for we have true ideas). Desanti’s contention is that it is integral to the phenomenological method that this expression be nonsensical, for the method itself demands that every experience of purportedly having a true idea be subjected to the eidetic reduction in order to reveal this experience’s own subtending structures. Desanti recognizes that this process leads either to the proposition of a transcendental ego or structure, in any event a putative “zero point” at which the methodological process stops, or to an infinite regress. Desanti, taking Spinoza as his guide on this score, opts for the latter option, because, in his view, the infinite regress also portends an infinite progress. This process—be it regress or progress—is for Desanti the essential temporality of thinking. In a provocative twist, Desanti suggests that it is this process of thinking itself, so well described by the phenomenological method, that in fact displays the validity of Spinoza’s remark. In each phenomenological reduction, a “true idea” is produced. Spinoza’s contempt for the concept of “zero point” means that the phenomenologist is constitutionally unable to understand what Spinoza could possibly mean by “true idea.” A true idea for Spinoza is an adequate idea; moving beyond it to the next true idea in no way compromises the truth of the true idea that is the condition for the next one. Desanti’s claim is that it is the phenomenologist’s own rational methodology, moving from one “immediate” idea to the next without mediation, that develops Spinoza’s proposition despite the phenomenologist’s intentions." (p.97)
-Jean-Toussaint Desanti, From Stalinism to Asceticism,
"
-Knox Peden, Spinoza Contra Phenomenology. French Rationalism from Cavaillès to Deleuze,
"Since Desanti was uneasy with the tendency among his classmates to identify with one hero along the “royal way” of philosophy being offered by Brunschvicg at the time -be it Plato, Descartes, Spinoza, or, most popularly, Kant—Cavaillès’s more narrow and technical focus on “logistics” allowed Desanti to remain uncommitted even as he developed an early expertise in a field otherwise marginalized in the French context." (p.96)
"Desanti found that Spinoza had already taken each and every step the only way it could be taken in his unique philosophical system. Unlike mathematical reasoning, which affords a plurality of routes and ways to achieve the same rational conclusions, Spinoza’s strictness was in extremis and eliminated any wandering from the set path. Nevertheless, Spinoza’s commitment to rationalism would mark Desanti indelibly ; this commitment remained a clear feature of Desanti’s thought for the rest of his career. In 1935, Maurice Merleau-Ponty replaced Cavaillès as caïman, the instructor charged with preparing students at the ENS for the agrégation in philosophy. Shortly after his arrival, he charged Desanti with the task of preparing a presentation on the subject of the “immediate.” The result of this experience was decisive for Desanti’s own intellectual development." (p.96)
"A talk titled “Spinoza and Phenomenology” that Desanti delivered in 1990 at a Sorbonne symposium on Spinoza and the twentieth century. The talk’s contents are a protracted “thought experiment” in which Desanti seeks to account for the silence over Spinoza in evidence among the “Masters of Phenomenology.” Playing the role of an “impenitent phenomenologist,” Desanti tries to “effectuate the sense” of Spinoza’s key phrase from the Treatise on the Emendation of the Intellect: habemus enim ideam verum (roughly, for we have true ideas). Desanti’s contention is that it is integral to the phenomenological method that this expression be nonsensical, for the method itself demands that every experience of purportedly having a true idea be subjected to the eidetic reduction in order to reveal this experience’s own subtending structures. Desanti recognizes that this process leads either to the proposition of a transcendental ego or structure, in any event a putative “zero point” at which the methodological process stops, or to an infinite regress. Desanti, taking Spinoza as his guide on this score, opts for the latter option, because, in his view, the infinite regress also portends an infinite progress. This process—be it regress or progress—is for Desanti the essential temporality of thinking. In a provocative twist, Desanti suggests that it is this process of thinking itself, so well described by the phenomenological method, that in fact displays the validity of Spinoza’s remark. In each phenomenological reduction, a “true idea” is produced. Spinoza’s contempt for the concept of “zero point” means that the phenomenologist is constitutionally unable to understand what Spinoza could possibly mean by “true idea.” A true idea for Spinoza is an adequate idea; moving beyond it to the next true idea in no way compromises the truth of the true idea that is the condition for the next one. Desanti’s claim is that it is the phenomenologist’s own rational methodology, moving from one “immediate” idea to the next without mediation, that develops Spinoza’s proposition despite the phenomenologist’s intentions." (p.97)
-Jean-Toussaint Desanti, From Stalinism to Asceticism,
"
-Knox Peden, Spinoza Contra Phenomenology. French Rationalism from Cavaillès to Deleuze,
