Accueil
"Discussion concerning naturalness and unnaturalness has been ongoing in both public and academic spheres of bioethics and environmental ethics." (p.71)
"Generally, the (un)naturalness discussion has concerned two questions. First, it has been argued whether naturalness imorally relevant or in some other sense provides an important criterion for decision making. For example, does naturalness provide the ultimate goal for biological conservation [...] ? Do unnatural methods of gene transformation violate the dignity of human beings produced by them [...] ? Are natural species extinctions more acceptable than unnatural (i.e. human caused) ones [...] ? Are natural ecological disasters and disturbances more tolerable than unnatural ones [...] ?
There has also been discussion over whether something is natural or, when naturalness iunderstood as a continuous gradient, whether something is more natural than something else. For example, are restored ecosystems artifacts [...] ? Are genetically modified organisms (GMOs) more unnatural than products of traditional breeding and cultivation methods [...] ? Are domestic plants and animals artifacts [...] ?
The two issues are often intimately linked. The question about an entity's status as natural or unnatural is often motivated by the implications of such status. For example, a discussion concerning artif actuality of DNA-sequences is closely connected to the view that only artifacts may be patented [...] Similarly questions about naturalness of restored ecosystems are relevant to value discussions concerning them." (p.72)
"Naturalness as a goal of biological conservation may have little to do with naturalness of food, naturalness in animal welfare, or naturalness of genetic modification. Moreover, there is no reason to suppose that the moral relevance of one form of (un)naturalness would imply the moral relevance of some other form of (un)naturalness. The same is true about other ways in which naturalness may be relevant to decision making. For example, even though artifactuality may be required for patenting, there is no reason to suppose that in order for an entity to be patentable, it has to be unnatural in all senses of the term. Thus, in order to avoid conceptual confusions and their undesirable consequences, analysis of the different meanings and forms of the terms natural and unnatural is needed." (p.73)
"Forms of (un)naturalness differ with respect to the entities that are considered (un)natural. It is common that arguments from naturalness concern objects or beings [...]
Sometimes, not a whole object or being but only some of its traits are regarded as (un)natural. For example, Mill (1969, 393-95) discusses naturalness of such traits of human character as courageousness, selfishness, sympathy, self-control, and will for cleanliness. The discussion can be applied to animals and animal species too. It is sometimes claimed, for example, that a tendency to guard is a natural trait for dogs, and that a fear of human beings is a natural trait for members of many species of wild animals. However, the discussion does not need to be restricted to psychological traits. Having a transplanted heart, for example, might be considered an unnatural trait for human beings. Yet, having this trait does needed not imply that the person having it is unnatural. An unnatural trait does not necessarily imply unnaturalness of the whole entity having it." (pp.73-74)
"Following Lawrence B. Lombard (1999, 292-93), I understand the word 'event' to mean anything that happens. Some events are composed of other events (for example, a thunderstorm may consist of several heavy showers of rain and flashes of lightning), but not all groups of events comprise another event (for example, a certain explosion in Venus and my birth do not compose an event).
Actions are a subclass of events. All actions are events, but there are events (such as a flash of lightning) that are not actions. (Davidson 1980, 43 ; McCann 1998, 110.) Often an author' several actions are intimately linked together to serve a common intention. These collections of actions are called activities. For example, writing a book is an activity that consists of several actions of the author (typing, reading, and deleting, etc.). [...] I understand activities to be a subclass of events. To put it more strictly, they are a subclass of those events that are composed of several other events. Not all events in our body (or mind) are actions or activities. Behaviors differ from actions in their lack of intentionality (Davidson 1980, 44-45; 4; McCann 1998, 7, 110). For example, intentional voting by raising a hand is an action, whereas a kick reflex caused by tapping a knee with a rubber hammer is merely a behavior." (p.74)
"States of affairs can also be regarded as (un)natural. [...] Janet Radcliffe Richards (1984, 67-68) analyzes the discussion about/on (un)naturalness of certain social arrangements." (pp.74-75)
-Helena Siipi, "Dimensions of Naturalness", Ethics and the Environment, Vol. 13, No. 1 (Spring, 2008), pp. 71-103.
