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"In his doxography of Epicurus, Diogenes Laertius reports that the Epicurean sage will refrain from a number of activities, including falling in love, participating in politics, and worrying about funeral rites. Among Diogenes’ list of the Epicurean sage’s personal prohibitions, just after one about mingling with women in a way forbidden by law, is a proscription that seems uncharacteristic for a hedonistic egoist: “neither will he [the sage] punish household slaves ; however, he will pity them and pardon one who has good qualities” (X.118).
Adding nothing more about Epicurean attitudes toward slaves, Diogenes continues on with his list of the many activities the Epicurean sage avoids, among them making fine speeches, making less than fine speeches when intoxicated, begging, and “turning Cynic.” It’s unfortunate that Diogenes’ customary practice is merely to compile, rather than to explain, the data on his subject, since his record of the Epicurean sage’s comportment toward slaves is sorely in need of clarification: why would someone whose goal in life is her own pleasure feel pity for her subordinates, given that pity can be a source of psychological pain ?
It is tempting to answer that an Epicurean’s pity for her slaves is merely the product of her cold-hearted calculation to maximize her own pleasure: if the property-managing sage appears to care for the well-being of her slaves, she may make them more obedient and efficient, resulting in less work for the manager herself. Motivating this sort of interpretation may be the theory that an Epicurean’s pity for slaves manifests as a behavioral response rather than an emotional one. In other words, an Epicurean’s pity takes the form of ‘showing mercy toward’ or ‘taking pity on,’ which may mean that an Epicurean is lenient and refrains from harshly punishing her slaves but has no emotional stake in their plight. According to such an interpretation, the sage’s pity takes the form of an action that she pursues in order to benefit herself. Although I think such an interpretation cannot be entirely ruled out, this paper argues that Epicure ans feel genuine concern for others in certain circumstances—their pity en tails compassion for those who suffer certain misfortunes—and that such concern is consistent with hedonistic egoism.
Diogenes Laertius reports that Epicurus himself held several slaves, one of whom, Mys, is said to have been educated in the Epicurean school (DL X.3, X.10). Mys and three other slaves were manumitted in Epicurus’s will (DL X.21), but beyond that not much is known about Epicurus’s relationship with his subordinates. We know more about Epicurean attitudes toward slavery from Philodemus, an Epicurean from the first-century BCE, whose remarks suggest he was interested in his slaves mainly for their potential to increase their master’s pleasure. In On Property Management (De oeconomia), a polemical text aimed at the household-supervision strategies proposed by Xenophon and Theophrastus, it’s clear Philodemus expects that an Epicurean manager will have slaves, whose labor is useful for making a profit and providing the manager with leisure time to spend with friends (XXIII.11–18).2 At times Philodemus fits the bill of a cold-hearted, egoistic calculator, such as when he discounts Theophrastus’s advice “to make auspicious sacrifices and to provide enjoyments for the sake of servants rather than for the sake of free men” (X.215), noting that such advice “does more violence to our convictions” (X.25–6).
Although Philodemus does not explain his reasoning, he makes this remark in the course of describing the many behaviors that harm or at least do not promote the manager’s well-being, including “watching over everything oneself” and waking up before and going to sleep after one’s slaves (XI.25–38). These activities, he claims, are “wretched and unfitting for the philosopher” (XI.30–1).
The Epicurean manager should not be overly concerned about his servants (or about anything else), Philodemus argues, since excellence at managing one’s property is stressful, time-consuming, and detrimental to one’s character. Although it makes sense that a hedonistic egoist (such as an Epicurean) will use pity toward her subordinates as a behavioral tool to maximize her own pleasure, this paper argues that Epicureans will nevertheless have genuine feelings of concern for people, such as slaves, who are deprived of the natural good of security and the autonomy to behave in ways necessary to avoid pain.
As I aim to show, Epicureans believe insecurity is worthy of pity, and achieving confidence in one’s security requires the freedom to change not only one’s beliefs but also, and more importantly, one’s behavior. I contend further that Epicureans will endure the psychological pain of pity for the sake of social cohesion, the pleasure of which outweighs the pain of feeling bad for others.
More broadly speaking, my paper aims to shed light on the perennial problem of interpersonal relations in the lives of hedonistic egoists, and to challenge the standard scholarly view that Epicurean happiness is something achievable by anyone with correct beliefs." (pp.119-121)
"Epicureans believe confidence in security is a natural good, the lack of which is worthy of pity." (p.121)
"Those who experience the pleasure of a close-knit community enjoy the greatest confidence in their security ; if they die living this good life, their passing, even if premature, is not grievous. One assumes that those who die prematurely in a secure community succumb to something natural and unpreventable ; they were not victims of human violence, their fear of which was eliminated in their safe environment. [...]
What KD 40 may mean, though, is that what is worthy of pity is the painful life (and, presumably, death) of those who, lacking the protection of a friendly community, have no confidence in their security. Such people suffer the psychological pain of anxiety about their present and future safety, and physical pain too if their fears of bodily harm are realized. KD 40 suggests that an unsafe life is worthy of pity because such a life fails spectacularly to achieve what the Epicureans believe is necessary for human happiness.
However, by interpreting KD 40 differently one might object that Epicurus is claiming that individuals in secure communities come to realize that death is not worthy of pity ; pity is felt by those with no security, who are more likely to fear their own death and that of others, and for whom death might be more emotionally wrenching and terrifying than it is for those whose only vital threats are natural causes. As Austin writes regarding KD 40, “friendship within a stable political community enables an individual to acquire the appropriate attitudes toward death, as manifested in a tendency not to pity those who die” (2012, 115). Epicurean friends might reinforce each other’s belief that death is nothing and, thus, that the dead should not be pitied. Indeed, at the end of the Letter to Menoeceus Epicurus recommends practicing the Epicurean lifestyle not just by yourself but also “with someone similar to you,” the result of which will be your living “as a god among men”." (p.123)
"Although sheltered friends will probably experience pity very rarely—sheltered friends spend most of their time among their sheltered friends, whose easy lives and deaths are not worthy of pity—Epicurus gives us no sense that he believes pity should be eliminated altogether. And nothing says that Epicureans themselves cannot be the endangered loners, among whom pity may be a common experience in violent environments. An Epicurean may find herself among the endangered if she is unable to find like-minded friends or if such friends are not particularly adept at defending themselves and others." (p.124)
"If Epicureans pity those deprived of the pleasure of a trustworthy belief in their security, it stands to reason that Epicureans will pity slaves, whether their own or someone else’s. Although much of our evidence concerning the treatment of slaves in antiquity is anecdotal, and there is very little documentation from the perspective of slaves themselves, there is sufficient evidence of the legal and economic realities of ancient chattel slavery to conclude that personal security eluded many members of the slave class. Although there was some legal protection for slaves in ancient Athens, they nevertheless could not initiate litigation, and testimony in most Athenian court cases was admissible from slaves only if they had been tortured. Furthermore, mistreatment of slaves was not automatically prosecuted: either the master or some third-party was required to bring suit against the alleged perpetrator, and suits were rare when the perpetrator was the master himself. For Athenian slaves hoping to escape persecution, they could either run away or plead for asylum at a few sacred places around the city. The latter option did not guarantee a reprieve: it merely gave the slave the opportunity to be sold to a different master. Slaves in ancient Athens could not own property, and they required permission before spending their own money. In Rome, the situation was worse in many respects: in the slave society of Philodemus’s Rome, the law permitted owners to execute slaves for any reason. In addition, slaves were often separated from their families, a practice that must not have been too uncommon by Philodemus’s time, since he mentions a recommendation by Xenophon that masters should raise the children of good slaves but not those of bad ones, advice which Philodemus abhors (De oec. X.18–21). Although slaves could be manumitted in both ancient Greece and Rome, freed slaves often continued to struggle to maintain their security and community." (pp.125-126)
"Many scholars who support the standard interpretation also argue that Epicurean therapeutic methods are largely cognitive: Epicurean therapists employ rational arguments to remove false beliefs about sources of anxiety, and sometimes therapists make use of non-rational but nevertheless psychological faculties, such as the imagination, memory, and emotions. Whether the therapy appeals to patients’ intellects in order to replace false beliefs with true ones, or whether the therapy is more broadly cognitive and makes use of the mind’s rational as well as non-rational faculties, the consensus is that Epicurean treatments are not non-cognitive: since they engage the mind in some way or another, they are not strictly behavioral. As Voula Tsouna notes, the prescriptions of Epicurean therapy do not resemble the dietary restrictions advised by Posidonius and Galen.
Although there is no disputing that Epicurean therapy is primarily cognitive and its main tools are rational arguments, I think the role of psychological autonomy in Epicurean ethics has been overplayed. Epicureans acknowledge that psychological autonomy is not always sufficient for happiness: several texts show that independence from false beliefs is of limited value in avoiding and treating pains whose causes are non-cognitive. Even people with correct beliefs can suffer psychological pain that is remediable only by behavioral changes. Without the behavioral autonomy to avoid pain, people whose pain is not caused by an error in judgment and who are dealing with exceptionally harmful people, situations, and desires will be unable to achieve happiness and will therefore become objects of pity.
Behavioral autonomy is most necessary, according to Epicureans, when dealing with the most recalcitrant of human fears, chief among them the fear of being harmed or killed by others. In order to eliminate this fear and enjoy confidence in one’s security, one must be at liberty to make behavioral as well as cognitive changes, as several Epicurean texts show. For instance, KD 14 advocates a quiet life, removed from the troubles of society: “Although some security against other people arises by means of the power to resist and by means of prosperity, the purest security comes from quietude and withdrawal from the many.” In addition, KD 39 endorses avoidance tactics to treat a broad range of disturbances, including the fear of violence, advising us to steer clear of bothersome things if they become unmanageable." (pp.127-128)
"Since behavioral changes are not an option for everyone, and since Epicureans believe such changes are sometimes necessary in order to achieve or maintain happiness, it is not the case that the Epicurean best life is achievable by any rational person." (p.131)
"The Epicureans also acknowledge that chance can affect one’s happiness." (note 29 p.131)
"It’s one thing to acknowledge that someone’s situation is unfortunate; it’s quite another thing to feel compassion for another’s suffering. [...] If this is what Epicureans believe, then why will they feel bad for anyone ?" (p.132)
"There is good reason to believe that Epicureans will bear the psychological discomfort of pitying others in order to achieve the greater pleasure of social cohesion and to avoid the greater pain of social conflict. According to several texts, Epicureans believe pity is necessary for fostering solidarity among fellow humans, and solidarity is important for warding off fears for one’s safety, as I discussed earlier. As we saw from De Rerum Natura, Lucretius claims that pity lays the foundation for human compacts for security, and without such compacts the human race would have died out completely (DRN V.1019–27). Evidently, the pleasure of security is worth the pain of pity and any other pains that might arise from agreeing to protect other people. Other texts suggest that Epicureans believe that feelings for other humans keep us from becoming heartless savages; some emotion is better than none at all. Plutarch reports, with subtle mockery, that Epicurus makes claims along such lines:
I think I will take from them first the following, that they quarrel with those who do away with grief and tears and groaning about the death of friends, and they say that the absence of grief, which renders us inhuman, arises from another, greater evil, namely, the most raw savagery or an untempered and raging thirst for fame. As a result, they think it is better to be affected somewhat and to be distressed and for the eyes to glisten and melt with tears. Because of what they have written concerning how they feel, some think they are tender and friendly."(pp.133-134)
"Plutarch also suggests in this passage, although not very clearly, that the Epicureans believe emotional apathy stems from a desire for fame, which else where they classify as both unnatural and unnecessary and rank among the most noxious desires: fame, like love, always leads to pain and should never be pursued. Are the Epicureans disparaging some unnamed people who hope to earn a reputation for remaining unemotional in the face of great distress ? If so, the target is most likely the Stoics and the Megarians, whom the Epicureans criticize for being overly phlegmatic. Seneca reports the following concerning this disagreement between the schools:
You want to know whether Epicurus is right to criticize, as he does in one letter, those who say that a wise man is self-sufficient and so does not need a friend. Epicurus makes this objection against Stilpo and those [i.e., the Stoics] who held that the highest good is a soul free of passions.
The Epicurean criticism reported by Plutarch and Seneca seems to be that the basic human need to connect with other humans is facilitated by our feelings for one another, and there are only bad reasons to suppress such feelings: an affectless person is either an utter brute or consumed by an unhealthy desire for notoriety." (p.133)
"The sage stands to reap hedonic benefits in the long term by allowing herself to have feelings." (p.134)
"Although it is possible that some people will attempt to fake their emotions in order to win friends and influence people, it’s doubtful that Epicureans will go this route. For starters, it’s arguably more work to fake an emotion than it is to feel it genuinely: it is a struggle to impersonate someone with genuine feelings, and even more trouble to do so convincingly. Faking will hardly be worth the trouble when the social benefits of pretending to feel pity can be achieved with less inconvenience by feeling the real thing. In addition, there is always a chance the faker’s duplicity will be discovered, the consequences of which are likely to be devastating. According to Epicureans, the fear of being caught is a major deterrent to bad behavior, and fakers will be wise to fear the repercussions of conning others: if exposed, fakers risk losing people’s trust, which Epicureans believe is essential for security. One who is unwilling or unable to experience genuine pity for others may be seen as a threat to social cohesion: if, as Epicureans believe, pity and other interpersonal emotions bind humans to each other, a person without such emotions should not be relied upon to maintain the sort of lasting relationships that foster security and happiness." (p.134)
"It’s not a foregone conclusion that a master need not worry about the quality of her relationships with her slaves: Philodemus reports in On Anger (De ir.) that slave owners should fear that their mistreatment of slaves will lead to serious trouble for the owners themselves:
And as for what comes from slaves, not just failures in services performed, but difficulties and all sorts of misfortunes result, because of their (i.e., the masters’) rages, abuse, threats, and unmotivated, continual, and excessive punishments of their slaves, who are incited to everything (imaginable), and if they can kill their masters, do it with great pleasure ; if they find they cannot, their children and spouses; or if not even those, burn down their houses or destroy the rest of their property. (De ir. XXIV.1736).
Although we saw earlier that Philodemus believes the ideal property manager should not show too much concern for her slaves, it’s clear from On Anger that he also believes that a property manager’s comportment toward her slaves does indeed bear on her security (and also, Philodemus suggests, on her profit). It thus makes no hedonic sense for slave owners to discount their subordinates’ feelings or to risk the consequences of being caught faking their emotions." (p.135)
"One can be pleased by the relative happiness of one’s own situation without pitying disadvantaged others, but pity tends to heighten one’s sense of another’s misfortune, which may heighten an Epicurean’s sense of her own relative advantage. And, of course, only genuine pity will result in a heightened sense of one’s hedonic advantage; the Epicurean has nothing to gain in this case from faking her feelings for others.
In the end, Epicureans will endure the psychological pain of pity in order to increase their own pleasure and minimize their own pain: pitying others strengthens interpersonal bonds, which in turn increases security, and pity allows Epicureans to achieve what may appear to some as a rather perverse pleasure from considering how much better off they are than others. Although my argument has given us no reason to believe that Epicureans’ feelings for others will compel them to act altruistically or against their own interest, it nevertheless shows that their egoistic hedonism will not prevent them from genuinely feeling bad for others. This has interesting consequences for our understanding of the difference between Epicureans and Stoics on the role of the passions in the good life, though there is not sufficient space to do justice to this topic here. The Stoics claim that passions (πάθη), pity included, should be completely eliminated because they are always excessive and stem from false judgments. The Epicureans, as we have seen, believe that some passions are necessary for forming beneficial relations with other humans and avoiding isolation and unhappiness. The emotion of pity, painful though it might be, is therefore a means to a greater pleasure."
-Kelly E. Arenson, "Epicureans on Pity, Slavery, and Autonomy", Proceedings of the Boston Area Colloquium of Ancient Philosophy, 34 (1), 2019, pp.119-136.
