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"There is a triad of ‘theories of perception’ which compete for the allegiance of philosophers: Direct Realism, Representationalism and Phenomenalism. Each may be conceived of as an answer to the question ‘What is the direct or immediate object of awareness when we perceive ?’
Direct Realism answers that the immediate object of awareness is never anything but a physical existent, which exists independently of the awareness of it.
In opposition to this, Representationalism and Phenomenalism hold that the immediate object of awareness is a sense-impression ot sense-datum, and such an object, it is usually assumed, cannot exist independently of the awareness of it. But Representationalism and Phenomenalism themselves divide over the question ‘What is a physical object ?’ The Representationalist holds that physical objects are not to be identified with the immediate objects of awareness, but are quite distinct from, and capable of existing independently of, these immediate objects. The Phenomenalist, on the other hand, holds that physical objects are nothing more than constructions out of the immediate objects of awareness, and so holds that physical objects do not exist independently of perception." (p.XI)
"It might be said that the meaning of the words ‘direct’ and ‘immediate’ is quite obscure, and that until they have been given some meaning, if they can be given any, this question about the direct or immediate object of awareness is no question at all. But I hope to show that the question is a perfectly precise and definite one, and that it is not to be answered off-hand, in the off-hand way that we can say that the things we perceive are physical objects. It is true that this is not a scientific question, to be answered by observation and experiment, but is a conceptual question, to be answered by the means appropriate to the discussion of a conceptual question, viz. philosophical argument. But it is just as real a question as, say, the conceptual question ‘What is an unconscious wish ?”
I hold that the Direct Realist answer to the question ‘What is the direct or immediate object of awareness when we perceive ?’ is the correct one, and this book is a defence of Direct Realism. I shall discuss in turn what I take to be the main lines of objection to Direct Realism, try to answer them, and at the same time present what I take to be decisive objections to Representationalism and Phenomenalism. But in the course of the book I hope also to ask and answer the questions ‘What is perception ?’, ‘What is a sense-impression?’, and even to cast some indirect light on the question “What is a physical object ?’." (p.XII)
" [Chapter I]
"In this chapter I will examine three arguments which purport to prove that some or all of the sensible qualities of objects have no existence except for a perceiving subject. By ‘sensible qualities’ are meant such qualities as colour, shape, size, motion, hardness, heat, sound, taste and smell, qualities of objects which are said to be perceived by the senses. These three arguments are all to be found in Berkeley’s ‘First Dialogue’. We shall see that each of these arguments is invalid." (p.3)
"The object of the Argument from Sensation is to show that the sensible qualities of objects are nothing but species of sensations. Berkeley takes physical pain as a paradigm case of a sensation. Now sensations are mind-dependent, or subjective. A sensation demands the existence of a person conscious of having it, somebody who feels it. So if the sensible qualities of things could be shown to be on all fours with what are ordinarily called sensations, it would follow that the sensible qualities would have been shown to be mind-dependent, or subjective." (pp.3-4)
"Berkeley’s argument is not very convincing. He takes the sensible quality of heat, which is one of the cases where the assimilation of sensible qualities to sensations is most plausible. He argues that if we treat any particular degree of heat as a sensation then we must treat all degrees of heat as sensations. But, he goes on, it cannot be denied that a very great heat is a great pain. Hence it is a sensation. It follows that any degree of heat is a sensation.
Berkeley considers the objection that great heat is not identical with great pain, but is only the cause of the pain. But he replies to this by saying that when, for instance, our hand is too near the fire, we only ‘perceive one simple uniform sensation’. There is no possibility of distinguishing heat and pain.
But to see that Berkeley is wrong here, we do not have to investigate the unclear and difficult question whether our sensation is really simple and uniform in such a case. A very simple argument suffices to show that heat must be different from pain. For at different times our tolerance of heat can be quite different. What was once a painful heat, may become a painful heat no longer. Now if the very same heat is sometimes painful, but is sometimes not painful, this shows that there is some distinction to be made between heat and pain.
Now Berkeley would certainly reply to this argument by saying that, where I acquire a greater tolerance of heat, we have a case where the object in question does not feel so hot. And it is true, of course, that we do talk in this way. As we settle into a bath we say that the hot water gradually feels less hot, even where the actual temperature of the water is not falling. But this reply is really nothing to Berkeley’s purpose. What he is trying to prove is that heat, a quality of physical objects, is a sensation. It will do him no good to prove that the pain varies in exact proportion to the heat that an object feels to have to a person at a particular time. For when we talk of the heat that an object feels to have to a person at a particular time we are not talking about the quality of an object ; but about the person’s impression of the heat of the object. We distinguish between an object having a certain colour, and its looking to somebody to have a certain colour. In the same way we distinguish between an object being hot, and its feeling hot to us. Putting the matter more controversially, but conveniently, we distinguish between the qualities of objects, and our sense-impressions of these qualities. So to argue that, when the touching of a hot object causes us less pain, then the object does not feel so hot to us, would prove at best that our sense-impressions of heat are simply sensations. It would do nothing to show that any quality of a physical object, such as the quality heat, is a sensation. It is true, of course, that Berkeley fails to make a distinction between sensible qualities and sense-impressions, passing between the two with an ease born of oversight. But there is a distinction between a thing’s actual heat, and the heat it feels to us to have on a particular occasion. If Berkeley wishes to deny the existence of such a distinction he is simply wrong." (pp.4-5)
-David M. Armstrong, Perception and the physical world, London / New York, Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1973 (1961 pour la première édition), 196 pages.
