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https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Robert_Arrington
"The study of ethics underwent some dramatic changes in direction during the 1970s and 1980s. During the previous three decades metaethical noncognitivism has been the predominant point of view [...] This noncognitivist perspective came under critical scrutiny as early as the late 1950s, and by the 1970s its authority began to be undermined. [...] Moral skeptics, who never altogether disappear from view, changed their tactics. No longer appealing to noncognitivist argument, they opted instaed for relativistic considerations or developed novel interpretations of moral judgments such as the error theory." (p.1)
"The dominant ethical problems of the mid-twentieth century were metaethical, relating to questions about the meaning of moral terms and the nature and structure of moral reasoning." (p.2)
"The standard sources for the theory of emotivism are A. J. Ayer, Language, Truth, and Logic (New York: Dorer, 1946), and Charles L. Stevenson, Ethics and Language (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1944). Important responses to emotivism are found in Stephen Toulmin, The Place of Reason in Ethics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1950) ; P. H. Nowell-Smith, Ethics (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1954) ; Paul Edwards, The Logic of Moral Discourse (New York: Free Press, 1955) ; Carl Wellman, The Language of Ethics (Cambridge: Havard University Press, 1961) ; Kurt Baier, The Moral Point of View (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1958) ; and R. B. Brandt, Ethical Theory (Englewood Cliffs, N. J.: Prentice-Hall, 1959)." (p.3)
"The theory of prescriptivism, especially as it was articulated in the philosophy of R. M. Hare, came to command widespread respect and to replace emotivism view. [...]
Hare's metaethical theory had much to recommend it. It presented itself as a theory sensitive to the developments in the philosophy of language which encouraged one to look for distinctive uses of language and to break away from the assumption that all or most language functions descriptively. Futhermore, his theory appealed to those who could make no sense of there being moral truths (and falsehoods) -for Hare, one's ultimate moral convictions arise out of personal decisions and, being prescriptive, can hardly be said to correspond to any facts in the world. For this reason, ethical skeptics of various kinds were attracted to prescriptivism. Finally, however, Hare was able to accommodate and illuminate the fact that moral discourse, although prescriptive, nevertheless is constrained by canons of reasoning that permit certain forms of moral debate and rule out others. Giving reason a place in morality allowed Hare to escape the criticism often leveled against emotivism to the effect that it so construes moral language that all debate becomes a matter of nonrational, emotional persuasion. Hence prescriptivism, while attracting the skeptics, also appealed to many who insisted that "not just anything goes" in morality and that reason and reflection have an important part to play in the unfolding of the moral life.
As a result, however, of accommodating so many different demands and assumptions presctivism inevitably began to generate its own critics. Some, most notably Philippa Foot, questioned Hare's account of the meaning of moral terms, especially the notion of an independant evaluative meaning. And others, principally John Searle, challenged Hare's denial that moral judgments can be derived solely from factual premises. Many philosophers found it difficult to accept the view that at bottom our moral convictions are mely decisions of principle, and many remained unconvinced that prescriptividsm allowed reason any greater role in morality than did the earlier theory of emotivism. But no new metaethical position as able to command widesprad agreement." (pp.3-4)
"
(pp.5-6)
-Robert L. Arrington, Rationalism, Realism, and Relativism: Perspectives in Contemporary Moral Epistemology, Ithaca, Cornell University Press, 1989, 321 pages.
"The study of ethics underwent some dramatic changes in direction during the 1970s and 1980s. During the previous three decades metaethical noncognitivism has been the predominant point of view [...] This noncognitivist perspective came under critical scrutiny as early as the late 1950s, and by the 1970s its authority began to be undermined. [...] Moral skeptics, who never altogether disappear from view, changed their tactics. No longer appealing to noncognitivist argument, they opted instaed for relativistic considerations or developed novel interpretations of moral judgments such as the error theory." (p.1)
"The dominant ethical problems of the mid-twentieth century were metaethical, relating to questions about the meaning of moral terms and the nature and structure of moral reasoning." (p.2)
"The standard sources for the theory of emotivism are A. J. Ayer, Language, Truth, and Logic (New York: Dorer, 1946), and Charles L. Stevenson, Ethics and Language (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1944). Important responses to emotivism are found in Stephen Toulmin, The Place of Reason in Ethics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1950) ; P. H. Nowell-Smith, Ethics (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1954) ; Paul Edwards, The Logic of Moral Discourse (New York: Free Press, 1955) ; Carl Wellman, The Language of Ethics (Cambridge: Havard University Press, 1961) ; Kurt Baier, The Moral Point of View (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1958) ; and R. B. Brandt, Ethical Theory (Englewood Cliffs, N. J.: Prentice-Hall, 1959)." (p.3)
"The theory of prescriptivism, especially as it was articulated in the philosophy of R. M. Hare, came to command widespread respect and to replace emotivism view. [...]
Hare's metaethical theory had much to recommend it. It presented itself as a theory sensitive to the developments in the philosophy of language which encouraged one to look for distinctive uses of language and to break away from the assumption that all or most language functions descriptively. Futhermore, his theory appealed to those who could make no sense of there being moral truths (and falsehoods) -for Hare, one's ultimate moral convictions arise out of personal decisions and, being prescriptive, can hardly be said to correspond to any facts in the world. For this reason, ethical skeptics of various kinds were attracted to prescriptivism. Finally, however, Hare was able to accommodate and illuminate the fact that moral discourse, although prescriptive, nevertheless is constrained by canons of reasoning that permit certain forms of moral debate and rule out others. Giving reason a place in morality allowed Hare to escape the criticism often leveled against emotivism to the effect that it so construes moral language that all debate becomes a matter of nonrational, emotional persuasion. Hence prescriptivism, while attracting the skeptics, also appealed to many who insisted that "not just anything goes" in morality and that reason and reflection have an important part to play in the unfolding of the moral life.
As a result, however, of accommodating so many different demands and assumptions presctivism inevitably began to generate its own critics. Some, most notably Philippa Foot, questioned Hare's account of the meaning of moral terms, especially the notion of an independant evaluative meaning. And others, principally John Searle, challenged Hare's denial that moral judgments can be derived solely from factual premises. Many philosophers found it difficult to accept the view that at bottom our moral convictions are mely decisions of principle, and many remained unconvinced that prescriptividsm allowed reason any greater role in morality than did the earlier theory of emotivism. But no new metaethical position as able to command widesprad agreement." (pp.3-4)
"
(pp.5-6)
-Robert L. Arrington, Rationalism, Realism, and Relativism: Perspectives in Contemporary Moral Epistemology, Ithaca, Cornell University Press, 1989, 321 pages.
