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https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ernest_Nagel
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"I wish […] to examine the major arguments as i have encountered them which they seem to be mistaken. I hope thereby to show that critics of historical inevitability who have argued for either a radical or a qualified indeterminism in humain affairs, have rejected one extreme position only to adopt another one no less extreme and dubious." (p.298)
"When determinism is understood in the above sense, the assumption that a system is déterministic does not entail hat the states of the system are predicable […] A system may be a deterministic one, though we may not know that it is such ; and it is a mistake to identify, as some influential philosophers seem to have done, the meaning of "determinism" with the possibility of prediction with unlimited accuracy." (p.295)
"Determinism cannot be definitively disproved, since our failure to discover the determining conditions for some event (or type of event) does not prove that there are in fact no such conditions. In my view, therefore, a doctrine of universal determinism can be defended only partly on the ground that it is a correct generalized description of the world as we actually know it ; and its operative role inquiry seems to me to be that of a guiding principle, which formulates in a a comprehensive fashion one of the major objectives of positive science." (p.296)
"I shall examine the main reasons that have been Advanced for such rejection under the following convenients heads: 1): the argument from the non-existence of so-called "necessary laws of development" in humain history ; 2) the argument from the unpredictability and inexplicability of human events ; 3) the argument from the emergence of novelties in humain affairs ; 4) the argument from the occurrence of chance events in human history ; and 5): the argument from the incompatibility of determinsm with the reality of human Freedom and with the attribution of moral responsability." (p.297)
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(pp.297-306)
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(p.306-307)
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(p.308-311)
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(311-316)
"I dot not believe that determinism is a demonstrable thesis. […]
For on my construction of determinism, it is in effect a regulative principle which formulates the general objective of science as a search for explanations -as a quest for ascertaining the conditions upon which the occurrence of events is contingent. […] Nevertheless, to abandon the deterministic principle itself, is to withdraw from the enterprise of science. And i do not believe that however acute is our awareness of the rich variety of human experience, and however sensitive our concern for the fuller development of human individuality, our best interests will be served by stopping objective inquiry into the various conditions which determine the existence of human traits ans actions, and by thus shutting the door to the progressive liberation from illusion that can come from the achievement of such knowledge." (p.316-317)
-Ernest Nagel, "Determinism In History", Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Vol. 20, No. 3 (Mar., 1960), pp. 291-317.
https://www.jstor.org/stable/2105051?seq=1#page_scan_tab_contents
"I wish […] to examine the major arguments as i have encountered them which they seem to be mistaken. I hope thereby to show that critics of historical inevitability who have argued for either a radical or a qualified indeterminism in humain affairs, have rejected one extreme position only to adopt another one no less extreme and dubious." (p.298)
"When determinism is understood in the above sense, the assumption that a system is déterministic does not entail hat the states of the system are predicable […] A system may be a deterministic one, though we may not know that it is such ; and it is a mistake to identify, as some influential philosophers seem to have done, the meaning of "determinism" with the possibility of prediction with unlimited accuracy." (p.295)
"Determinism cannot be definitively disproved, since our failure to discover the determining conditions for some event (or type of event) does not prove that there are in fact no such conditions. In my view, therefore, a doctrine of universal determinism can be defended only partly on the ground that it is a correct generalized description of the world as we actually know it ; and its operative role inquiry seems to me to be that of a guiding principle, which formulates in a a comprehensive fashion one of the major objectives of positive science." (p.296)
"I shall examine the main reasons that have been Advanced for such rejection under the following convenients heads: 1): the argument from the non-existence of so-called "necessary laws of development" in humain history ; 2) the argument from the unpredictability and inexplicability of human events ; 3) the argument from the emergence of novelties in humain affairs ; 4) the argument from the occurrence of chance events in human history ; and 5): the argument from the incompatibility of determinsm with the reality of human Freedom and with the attribution of moral responsability." (p.297)
"
(pp.297-306)
"
(p.306-307)
"
(p.308-311)
"
(311-316)
"I dot not believe that determinism is a demonstrable thesis. […]
For on my construction of determinism, it is in effect a regulative principle which formulates the general objective of science as a search for explanations -as a quest for ascertaining the conditions upon which the occurrence of events is contingent. […] Nevertheless, to abandon the deterministic principle itself, is to withdraw from the enterprise of science. And i do not believe that however acute is our awareness of the rich variety of human experience, and however sensitive our concern for the fuller development of human individuality, our best interests will be served by stopping objective inquiry into the various conditions which determine the existence of human traits ans actions, and by thus shutting the door to the progressive liberation from illusion that can come from the achievement of such knowledge." (p.316-317)
-Ernest Nagel, "Determinism In History", Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Vol. 20, No. 3 (Mar., 1960), pp. 291-317.
