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http://scholar.harvard.edu/files/bonikowski/files/bonikowski_and_dimaggio_-_varieties_of_american_popular_nationalism.pdf
"We explore attitudes on four dimensions of nationalism simultaneously: national identification (feelings of closeness to the nation); criteria of national membership (what makes someone “truly American”); pride in the nation’s heritage and in specific institutions; and national hubris (beliefs entailing often invidious comparison between the United States and other countries). We exclude attitudes toward policy issues like immigration and economic protectionism that, although plausibly related to views of nationhood, are not themselves constitutive of those views." (p.3)
"Brubaker (2004:10) defines “nationalism” not as an elite ideology or a specific set of normative beliefs, but as a domain: “a heterogeneous set of ‘nation’- oriented idioms, practices, and possibilities that are continuously available or ‘endemic’ in modern cultural and political life.” We adopt this broader definition, because we wish to understand how a wide range of attitudes that constitute respondents’ nation-schemata— from love of country and bellicosity toward outsiders to critical engagement with the nation—are distributed, how they respond to external events, and how they link to other attitudes and policy preferences." (p.4)
"Schildkraut (2002, 2011) affirms the existence of Smith’s (1997) three forms of national ideology, adding a fourth, “incorporationism,” that depicts the United States as an immigrant nation continually strengthened by the infusion and assimilation of successive waves of migrants." (p.5)
"National identification. National identification— the importance of national identity relative to other aspects of personal identity—is a central part of many conceptions of nationalism. Historical accounts of American nationalism (Kohn 1957) have emphasized the critical importance of the shift from the predominance of state identifications to identification with the national government in the early days of the Republic; and the nation fought a Civil War to decide the primacy of national versus regional identification (Faust 1988). According to Citrin and colleagues (1994:2), “nationalism is successful when it takes precedence over available alternative foci of affiliation such as kinship, religion, economic interest, race or language.” GSS respondents were asked, “How close do you feel to your [town or city; state; America; North America].” Respondents were about twice as likely (51 percent) to report feeling “very close” to “America” than to any other region or political unit." (p.6)
"Criteria of legitimate membership. Most accounts of American nationalism regard answers to the question of “Who is an American?” (or in the wording of the GSS, who is “truly American”) as marking the difference between the creedal (or civic) and ethnocultural traditions (Lieven 2004; Smith 1997; Walzer 1990). The former embraces the liberal creed of tolerance and universalism, whereas the latter draws strong boundaries based on characteristics such as birthplace, language, religion, and race. Historically, the United States has oscillated between the openness to newcomers inscribed on the Statue of Liberty, on the one hand, and recurrent episodes of nativist exclusion on the other (Higham [1955] 1983). Focusing on “characteristics that subjectively define membership in a particular political community,” Citrin, Reingold, and Green (1990:1128) find strong support among a sample of Californians for creedal liberalism, yet substantial support, as well, for the salience of linguistic and religious criteria. A broad consensus emerged among 2004 GSS respondents around the importance to being “truly American” of American citizenship, ability to speak English, feeling American, and “respecting America’s political institutions and laws,” with majorities calling these “very important” and with over 90 percent believing these were “fairly important” or “very important.” Fewer respondents regarded being “born in America” or having “lived in America for most of one’s life” as very important, but these criteria received substantial support nonetheless, with more than three of four respondents selecting “fairly” or “very” important. Respondents were more divided in their views of the centrality of Christianity to national membership: a plurality (48 percent) chose “very important,” but the next most popular response, from 18 percent of respondents, was “not very important.” Overall, 65 percent reported that Christianity was a fairly or very important criterion, whereas 35 percent selected “not very important” or “not important at all.” "(pp.6-
"National pride. Citrin, Wong, and Duff (2001) define national pride as central to patriotism (which they regard as closely linked to nationalism). Pride is different from but associated with identification, in that emotional gratification from the achievements of an entity increase with the subjective proximity of that entity to the self. As Smith and Kim (2006:127) put it, “National identity is the cohesive force that both holds nation-states together and shapes their relationships with other states. National pride is the positive affect that the public feels towards their country, resulting from their national identity.” GSS respondents were most proud of the United States’ armed forces, history, and scientific and technological achievements: over half the sample described themselves as “very proud” of each, with over 90 percent “very” or “somewhat” proud. Other sources of pride were achievement in sports and achievements in art and literature (over 90 percent somewhat or very proud), the way democracy works (89 percent), the nation’s economic achievements (87 percent), and its geopolitical influence (78 percent). Respondents rated two items lower: fair and equal treatment of all groups (75 percent) and the social security system (just 56 percent)." (p.8 )
"National hubris. Dictionaries define “chauvinism” as a form of patriotism that is extreme in extent and entails not only pride in one’s own group but assertions of superiority over others. We avoid the term because of its strong value connotations, instead using “hubris” to describe a set of items that reflect national pride in the United States in general and that affirm a preference for the United States compared to other nations (or, in one case, an unconditional view of citizens’ obligations if the United States is at odds with other countries). We use most of the measures that Smith and Kim (2006) refer to as “general” pride (as opposed to “domainspecific”). This construct is also consistent with Citrin and colleagues’ (2001:74–75) distinction between “patriotism” (“feelings of closeness to and pride in one’s country and its symbols”) and “chauvinism” (“an extreme and bounded loyalty, the belief in one’s country’s superiority, whether it’s right or wrong”). A number of authors go so far as to equate these measures with nationalism as a whole. Williams ([1951] 1970:490), in a classic text on U.S. society, defined nationalism as “the belief that U.S. values and institutions are the very best in the world” (see also De Figueiredo and Elkins 2003). Five GSS agree/disagree items tap this dimension of nationalist belief and sentiment. Two statements reflect judgments that, while invidious, are not necessarily expressive of moral superiority: “Generally speaking, America is a better country than most other countries,” and “I would rather be a citizen of America than of any other country in the world.” The first could be true if “better” refers to certain criteria on which the United States is relatively highly ranked (e.g., rule of law or civil liberties). The second could be motivated by pure self-interest rather than moral evaluation. These views received extensive support, with 90 percent of respondents endorsing the latter and 80 percent agreeing with the former. Items in the second pair are more directly indicative of feelings of national superiority: “The world would be a better place if people from other countries were more like Americans,” and “People should support their country even if their country is in the wrong.” In contrast to the first pair, agreement with these two statements was far more measured. Just 42 percent reported wishing that people from other countries were more like Americans, with a plurality placing themselves at the midpoint of the five-point scale. Only 37 percent endorsed the view of “my country right or wrong,” with 41 percent taking exception to this position." (p.8-9)
"Finally, a fifth item measures the degree to which “there are things about America that make me feel ashamed.” Although the question does not explicitly elicit a comparison between the United States and other countries, feelings of shame in the country imply some external reference point from which the respondent renders that judgment. Among the GSS respondents, 26 percent did not feel ashamed of the United States, and 56 percent did feel ashamed (the remaining 18 percent chose the intermediate response category, neither agreeing nor disagreeing with the question prompt)." (p.9)
"Ardent nationalists. Members of the larger of the extreme classes (24 percent of all respondents), which we call the ardent nationalists, were more likely than members of any other class to feel very close to America; more likely to say it was “very important” for a true American to possess all seven characteristics about which respondents were asked; most likely to report being “very proud” of all 10 potential sources of pride; and more likely than any other to agree or strongly agree with all five measures of national hubris. Even though the ardent nationalists scored highest on every dimension of nationalism— identification, criteria, pride, and hubris—they were not completely indiscriminate in their responses. Large majorities viewed each criterion of being “truly American” as “very important,” nearly all endorsed citizenship, ability to speak English, feeling American, having lived in America most of one’s life, and respecting institutions and laws, but fewer believed it was very important that a true American be born in America (86 percent) or be a Christian (75 percent)." (p.10)
"Nonetheless, a large majority apparently viewed Jews, Muslims, agnostics, and naturalized citizens as something less than “truly American.” Nearly all the ardent nationalists reported being “very proud” of America’s armed forces, history, and achievements in science and technology. Considerably fewer expressed great pride in the country’s fair and equal treatment of all groups (51 percent), its political influence in the world (48 percent), or its social security system (28 percent).11 Other pride items fell in between. Every member of this class expressed a preference for being a citizen of the United States and all but six agreed that America is a “better country” than most others. Nearly two thirds (64 percent) felt the world would be a better place if people in other countries were more like Americans, and just 50 percent, even of this most nationalistic group, believed people should support their country if it was in the wrong. More ardent nationalists than members of any other class (43 percent) were unashamed of any aspects of America. As illustrated in Table 2, the typical member of this class was a white male observant Evangelical or Mainline Protestant with relatively little formal education, living in the South. The ardent nationalists were eight years older than the remainder of the sample, with a mean age of 51. They had moderately low incomes and were more likely than others to have discontinued their schooling after high school. Politically, the ardent nationalists were most likely to selfidentify as strong Republicans and were among the least likely to self-identify as Democrats. The minority who self-identified as Democrats were older and had even lower incomes than their Republican counterparts; they were also less likely to identify as white or as Protestant, to live in the South, or to report having no religion. They were, however, very similar in terms of gender and likelihood of having been born in the United States. There is evidence that at least some ardent nationalism is associated with military service. Although data on veteran status were not available, 18 percent of men in the ardent nationalist class (compared to between 5 and 8 percent in the other groups) reported that they belonged to veterans’ organizations." (pp.11-12)
"The disengaged. The other extreme class was the smallest, making up 17 percent of the sample. It consists of what we call the “disengaged”— disengaged from the nation because they withheld the strongest endorsement of even the most widely held nationalist beliefs and sentiments, because they professed particularly low levels of pride in state institutions, and because they appeared to refrain from wholesale engagement with a national identity. The strongest evidence for the latter inference comes from responses to the national identification item: only 21 percent of respondents in this group reported feeling very close to the nation, compared to 56 percent for the remainder of the sample. They were also least likely to endorse any characteristic as “very important” for being “truly American,” often by wide margins. For instance, just half rated as very important the ability to speak English, which 89 percent of other respondents viewed as constitutive of being truly American. Even citizenship was termed “very important” by just 47 percent. Other criteria, such as being Christian, being born in the United States, or having lived in the United States for most of one’s life, were endorsed as very important by fewer than one in six. Disengaged respondents were also less likely than members of other classes to express high levels of national pride. Some of these results suggest a negative evaluation of the United States’ performance on elements of the national creed: just 10 percent reported being “very proud” of how American democracy works; 7 percent expressed great pride in equal treatment of all groups; 20 percent expressed pride in American history; and only two people expressed strong pride in the nation’s political influence. But they also expressed lower levels of pride in fields like science and technology (42 percent) and arts and literature (31 percent), where American achievements arguably have been demonstrably significant. Such patterns suggest these respondents were not only critical of the United States on some dimensions, but they also identified less strongly with the country in general, taking less pride in American achievements because their nationality was linked less closely to their sense of self. Not surprisingly, the disengaged were also least likely to endorse any of the hubris items.
Who were these least nationalistic Americans ? With a mean age of 38 years, they were the youngest of any class. African Americans and respondents in the “other” race category were overrepresented in their ranks, as were respondents born outside the United States. Highly underrepresented in this class; Jews and respondents who chose “no religion” and “other” religion were overrepresented. Although the incomes of the disengaged were the lowest of the four classes, this is a function of their young age; among respondents who were 25 or older, the mean income of the disengaged exceeded that of restrictive and ardent nationalists (but not creedal nationalists). Just under 10 percent of respondents assigned to this class did not hold U.S. citizenship, and another 6 percent were foreign-born citizens. (Nearly half of non-citizens in the sample were classified as disengaged, compared to just about 14 percent of the foreign-born citizens.) It is not surprising that non-citizens would fall into this class. The foreign-born are statusinconsistent—those who were classified as disengaged were highly educated and relatively well paid, but also 62 percent non-white, predominantly non-Christian, and, of course, newcomers to the United States. Five percent of the disengaged were second-generation Americans, but more than three quarters were neither immigrants nor children of immigrants. The native-born members of this class were well educated, young, relatively more likely than respondents assigned to other classes to be non-white, and most likely to describe their religious faith as “none” (36 percent) and their political affiliation as Democrat (80 percent). In other words, the disengaged class mixes a relatively small set of prosperous immigrants whose views may reflect a lack of identification with the United States with a much larger set of relatively young and well-educated native-born respondents who favor Democrats and are often (but not exclusively) members of ethnoracial or religious minorities." (pp.12-14)
"Restrictive nationalists. Unlike the ardent nationalists and the disengaged, the two remaining classes did not fall into a monotonic continuum from more to less nationalistic. They were, however, moderate in very different ways. One class, which we call the restrictive nationalists, consisted of respondents who expressed only moderate levels of national pride but defined being “truly American” in particularly exclusionary ways. The other class, which we call creedal nationalists because their profile of attitudes suggests fidelity to the American creed of liberal universalism, consisted of respondents who expressed high levels of national pride alongside a reluctance to qualify “truly American” with many strong conditions. We begin with the former: the restrictive nationalists, who were the largest group, constituting 38 percent of the sample. Members of this group were moderate in their national identification and espoused modest levels of national hubris (less than either the ardent or creedal nationalists): 94 percent preferred to be U.S. citizens, 79 percent agreed that there is no better country than the United States, 43 percent agreed that people in other countries should be more like Americans, and 38 percent endorsed the view that one should support one’s country even when it is wrong. Only 18 percent reported never experiencing shame in the United States. Restrictive nationalists were also similar to, although less extreme than, the ardent nationalists in placing conditions on who should be viewed as a “true American.” Well over half strongly endorsed the view that only Christians can be “truly American”; nearly three in four believed it is “very important” that a “true American” be born in the United States or have lived in the United States for most of one’s life; and 69 percent viewed respect for American political institutions and laws as very important for being truly American. Given their high level of support for restrictive criteria of national membership, surprisingly few members of this class reported being “very proud” of American achievements. Indeed, their responses to the pride questions were closer—in most cases, much closer—to those of the disengaged than to those of the ardent nationalists or creedal nationalists. Majorities expressed
great pride only in America’s armed forces and its history. By contrast, just 13 percent reported being very proud of American democracy and just 9 percent expressed great pride in America’s global political influence.
Who were these respondents who defined true Americans so restrictively yet evinced such low levels of national pride ? A rough generalization would depict them as Americans who are disadvantaged with respect to some combination of race, gender, or social class. Women were overrepresented among the restrictive nationalists; average incomes were the second lowest of all the classes; and a relatively small percentage of these respondents continued their education beyond high school. African Americans were strongly overrepresented in this class (68 percent were assigned to this group), as were Hispanics.18 Black Protestants were also represented in large numbers (much more so than in any other class), as were Evangelical Protestants. Not surprisingly given their criteria for “true American” status, relatively few were born outside the United States. Politically, Independents were strongly overrepresented (almost half the Independents in the sample were in this class), suggesting a gravitation to the restricted class by the politically disaffected. Although moderate Democrat and Republican identifiers were nearly equally likely to be assigned to this class, strongly partisan Republicans were underrepresented (most of them were found among the ardent and, to a lesser extent, creedal classes), whereas strong Democrats were overrepresented, reflecting the different socioeconomic positions and racial compositions of these two groups. The vast majority of African Americans in this class were Democrats, even though 14 of the 18 African American respondents who declared themselves Republicans were assigned to this category. In contrast, Hispanic respondents who identified with the Democratic Party were underrepresented and those who identified with the Republican Party were overrepresented in this class. Overall, it seems likely that this form of nationalism reflects ressentiment more than ideology. Given the unexpected prominence of African Americans among restrictive nationalists, we checked to see if these results were artifacts of poorer assignment of non-whites to latent classes due to a combination of smaller numbers with possible model heterogeneity. We thus compared mean individual-level class assignment probabilities for blacks and whites in each of the four classes. The results, presented in Table 3, show that the differences in the precision of classification by race across the four classes are minor. In the case of the restrictive class, the mean classification probabilities for black respondents are actually higher than those for white respondents." (pp.14-15)
"Creedal nationalists. Creedal nationalism refers to the form of national selfunderstanding associated with a set of liberal principles—universalism, democracy, and the rule of law—sometimes referred to as the American creed (Hartz 1964; Lieven 2004; Lipset 1963). The class of respondents we call creedal nationalists, which accounts for 22 percent of the sample, fits this profile more aptly than any other. Their form of nationalism was high on national pride but placed few restrictions on who can claim to be “truly American.” Creedal nationalists exhibited high levels of national identification, with 65 percent reporting that they felt “very close” to America, a percentage comparable to that of the ardent nationalists. They were less likely than the ardent nationalists to report being “very proud” of American achievements, but more likely to do so than either restrictive nationalists or the disengaged. Fifty-seven percent expressed great pride in the “way democracy works,” compared to just 13 percent of the restrictive nationalists, and 67 percent expressed pride in America’s economic achievements. They rivaled the ardent nationalists in pride in science and technology, with 82 percent reporting high levels. Like all but the disengaged, they strongly endorsed the ideas that America is a better country than most and that it is better to be a citizen of the United States. Although they did not score as high on the hubris variables as did the ardent nationalists, a plurality agreed that the world would be better if others were more like Americans and that one should support one’s country even if it is wrong. Like the ardent nationalists, they were also much less likely than restrictive nationalists or the disengaged to feel ashamed of America. The differences between creedal and restrictive nationalists are especially evident in their responses to the questions about the qualities that are very important in making someone “truly American.” They were more likely than the restrictive nationalists (85 versus 69 percent) to say that respect for American institutions and laws was very important. In contrast, few regarded being a Christian (21 percent), having been born in the United States (16 percent), or having lived here most of one’s life (20 percent) as very important criteria. In other words, although the creedal nationalists differentiated between degrees of Americanness, unlike the restrictive nationalists they did not do so on the basis of ascribed characteristics. Who were these just over one in five Americans whose views most closely approximated what is purportedly the American creed ? For the most part, they were men and women upon whom fate had smiled. They were most likely of any group to hold advanced degrees and to have graduated college; their mean income of $78,582 was almost 40 percent higher than that of the next wealthiest group (the ardent nationalists). Consistent with their economic well-being, they were disproportionately Republican, almost as much so as the ardent nationalists (although with fewer strong partisans). They were more likely than any other group to have been born outside the United States (23 percent), and most of the foreign-born in this group possessed U.S. citizenship. Very few were African American or identified as Black Protestants. This class also included the largest share of respondents who classified themselves as racially other and as Jewish, with Catholics well represented (constituting at 28 percent a religious plurality) but Protestants, especially Evangelicals, less likely to be assigned to this group. Regionally, creedal nationalists were overrepresented in the Pacific and Mountain states and underrepresented in the Northeast and South. In other words, creedal nationalism is, to some extent, the ideology of men and women for whom the American Dream has worked. In many cases, however, their immigrant origins, religious faith, racial identities, or regional locations place them at the periphery of what is often represented as the American mainstream. We suspect this combination of economic success with biographical marginality produces an affinity for a broadly inclusive understanding of the nation." (p.16)
"Policies related to ethnic and racial minorities. Like the studies reviewed above, we find significant net associations of particular forms of nationalism with a range of attitudes. Even with extensive controls, the disengaged were more supportive of multiculturalism and related positions than were members of other classes. Consistent with their support for civic definitions of a “true American” and their low values on hubris, the disengaged were much more likely than others to endorse the view that the government should “respect and protect the rights of minorities” and that it is better if minorities “maintain their distinctive customs and traditions.” Despite their inclusive views of the criteria for national membership, creedal nationalists did not differ significantly from ardent nationalists in their responses to either item tapping attitudes toward multiculturalism. And although they were more likely to say that government should support minority rights than were restrictive nationalists, they were less so than the disengaged. Interestingly— and somewhat surprisingly—ardent nationalists were more likely than creedal nationalists to support government assistance for protecting minority cultures.
Attitudes toward immigrants. We would expect nationalist sentiments—especially sentiments about the nation’s boundaries—to be associated with views of immigrants (Bail 2008), and they were. Restrictive nationalists were significantly more likely than creedal nationalists and the disengaged to believe that immigrants increase crime rates and take jobs away from Americans; and they were significantly more likely than creedal nationalists, the disengaged, and ardent nationalists to disagree that immigration is helpful to the economy and that immigrants improve society by bringing in new ideas and cultures, as well as to agree that there is too much government spending on immigration. Ardent nationalists were also significantly more likely than creedal nationalists (and in most cases, the disengaged) to agree that immigrants cause crime and take away American jobs, that immigrants should not hold the same rights as citizens, and that more needs to be done to prevent illegal immigration. Yet a restrictive view of national membership was not a prerequisite to critical views of immigration: creedal nationalists were also significantly more likely than the disengaged to agree that immigration takes away Americans’ jobs, increases crime rates, and consumes too much government spending, as well as to disagree that immigrants improve society by bringing in new ideas and cultures. They were also more likely than disengaged respondents to favor additional measures against illegal immigration." (p.20)
"Attitudes concerning America’s boundaries. Attitudes toward immigrants are a special case of responses to the penetration of national boundaries by people, cultures, and money from abroad. Results here were similar, with the disengaged expressing the least agreement, and restrictive nationalists and ardent nationalists expressing the most agreement, with protectionist and isolationist views: both groups were significantly more likely than creedal nationalists or the disengaged to endorse the views that U.S. television programming should favor American content, that foreigners should not be permitted to own land in the United States, and that the United States should cut back on imports. Ardent nationalists appeared even more concerned than restrictive nationalists with cultural intrusions from abroad, as evidenced by their stronger support for the showcasing of American content on U.S. television." (p.21)
"Pride in the nation’s accomplishments and national identification may inoculate Americans to some degree against the most extreme forms of racial or ethnic exclusion and xenophobia. We see this in the fact that ardent nationalists were less extreme on some variables measuring these dimensions than were the restrictive nationalists." (p.21)
"A willingness to place ethnocultural restrictions on membership in the national community and what we call hubris are associated with negative views of immigrants and immigration and isolationist and protectionist orientations toward the rest of the world." (p.25)
-Bonikowski (Bart) et DiMaggio (Paul), "Varieties of American Popular Nationalism", American Sociological Review, 2016, v.81, n.5, pp.949–980.
"We explore attitudes on four dimensions of nationalism simultaneously: national identification (feelings of closeness to the nation); criteria of national membership (what makes someone “truly American”); pride in the nation’s heritage and in specific institutions; and national hubris (beliefs entailing often invidious comparison between the United States and other countries). We exclude attitudes toward policy issues like immigration and economic protectionism that, although plausibly related to views of nationhood, are not themselves constitutive of those views." (p.3)
"Brubaker (2004:10) defines “nationalism” not as an elite ideology or a specific set of normative beliefs, but as a domain: “a heterogeneous set of ‘nation’- oriented idioms, practices, and possibilities that are continuously available or ‘endemic’ in modern cultural and political life.” We adopt this broader definition, because we wish to understand how a wide range of attitudes that constitute respondents’ nation-schemata— from love of country and bellicosity toward outsiders to critical engagement with the nation—are distributed, how they respond to external events, and how they link to other attitudes and policy preferences." (p.4)
"Schildkraut (2002, 2011) affirms the existence of Smith’s (1997) three forms of national ideology, adding a fourth, “incorporationism,” that depicts the United States as an immigrant nation continually strengthened by the infusion and assimilation of successive waves of migrants." (p.5)
"National identification. National identification— the importance of national identity relative to other aspects of personal identity—is a central part of many conceptions of nationalism. Historical accounts of American nationalism (Kohn 1957) have emphasized the critical importance of the shift from the predominance of state identifications to identification with the national government in the early days of the Republic; and the nation fought a Civil War to decide the primacy of national versus regional identification (Faust 1988). According to Citrin and colleagues (1994:2), “nationalism is successful when it takes precedence over available alternative foci of affiliation such as kinship, religion, economic interest, race or language.” GSS respondents were asked, “How close do you feel to your [town or city; state; America; North America].” Respondents were about twice as likely (51 percent) to report feeling “very close” to “America” than to any other region or political unit." (p.6)
"Criteria of legitimate membership. Most accounts of American nationalism regard answers to the question of “Who is an American?” (or in the wording of the GSS, who is “truly American”) as marking the difference between the creedal (or civic) and ethnocultural traditions (Lieven 2004; Smith 1997; Walzer 1990). The former embraces the liberal creed of tolerance and universalism, whereas the latter draws strong boundaries based on characteristics such as birthplace, language, religion, and race. Historically, the United States has oscillated between the openness to newcomers inscribed on the Statue of Liberty, on the one hand, and recurrent episodes of nativist exclusion on the other (Higham [1955] 1983). Focusing on “characteristics that subjectively define membership in a particular political community,” Citrin, Reingold, and Green (1990:1128) find strong support among a sample of Californians for creedal liberalism, yet substantial support, as well, for the salience of linguistic and religious criteria. A broad consensus emerged among 2004 GSS respondents around the importance to being “truly American” of American citizenship, ability to speak English, feeling American, and “respecting America’s political institutions and laws,” with majorities calling these “very important” and with over 90 percent believing these were “fairly important” or “very important.” Fewer respondents regarded being “born in America” or having “lived in America for most of one’s life” as very important, but these criteria received substantial support nonetheless, with more than three of four respondents selecting “fairly” or “very” important. Respondents were more divided in their views of the centrality of Christianity to national membership: a plurality (48 percent) chose “very important,” but the next most popular response, from 18 percent of respondents, was “not very important.” Overall, 65 percent reported that Christianity was a fairly or very important criterion, whereas 35 percent selected “not very important” or “not important at all.” "(pp.6-
"National pride. Citrin, Wong, and Duff (2001) define national pride as central to patriotism (which they regard as closely linked to nationalism). Pride is different from but associated with identification, in that emotional gratification from the achievements of an entity increase with the subjective proximity of that entity to the self. As Smith and Kim (2006:127) put it, “National identity is the cohesive force that both holds nation-states together and shapes their relationships with other states. National pride is the positive affect that the public feels towards their country, resulting from their national identity.” GSS respondents were most proud of the United States’ armed forces, history, and scientific and technological achievements: over half the sample described themselves as “very proud” of each, with over 90 percent “very” or “somewhat” proud. Other sources of pride were achievement in sports and achievements in art and literature (over 90 percent somewhat or very proud), the way democracy works (89 percent), the nation’s economic achievements (87 percent), and its geopolitical influence (78 percent). Respondents rated two items lower: fair and equal treatment of all groups (75 percent) and the social security system (just 56 percent)." (p.8 )
"National hubris. Dictionaries define “chauvinism” as a form of patriotism that is extreme in extent and entails not only pride in one’s own group but assertions of superiority over others. We avoid the term because of its strong value connotations, instead using “hubris” to describe a set of items that reflect national pride in the United States in general and that affirm a preference for the United States compared to other nations (or, in one case, an unconditional view of citizens’ obligations if the United States is at odds with other countries). We use most of the measures that Smith and Kim (2006) refer to as “general” pride (as opposed to “domainspecific”). This construct is also consistent with Citrin and colleagues’ (2001:74–75) distinction between “patriotism” (“feelings of closeness to and pride in one’s country and its symbols”) and “chauvinism” (“an extreme and bounded loyalty, the belief in one’s country’s superiority, whether it’s right or wrong”). A number of authors go so far as to equate these measures with nationalism as a whole. Williams ([1951] 1970:490), in a classic text on U.S. society, defined nationalism as “the belief that U.S. values and institutions are the very best in the world” (see also De Figueiredo and Elkins 2003). Five GSS agree/disagree items tap this dimension of nationalist belief and sentiment. Two statements reflect judgments that, while invidious, are not necessarily expressive of moral superiority: “Generally speaking, America is a better country than most other countries,” and “I would rather be a citizen of America than of any other country in the world.” The first could be true if “better” refers to certain criteria on which the United States is relatively highly ranked (e.g., rule of law or civil liberties). The second could be motivated by pure self-interest rather than moral evaluation. These views received extensive support, with 90 percent of respondents endorsing the latter and 80 percent agreeing with the former. Items in the second pair are more directly indicative of feelings of national superiority: “The world would be a better place if people from other countries were more like Americans,” and “People should support their country even if their country is in the wrong.” In contrast to the first pair, agreement with these two statements was far more measured. Just 42 percent reported wishing that people from other countries were more like Americans, with a plurality placing themselves at the midpoint of the five-point scale. Only 37 percent endorsed the view of “my country right or wrong,” with 41 percent taking exception to this position." (p.8-9)
"Finally, a fifth item measures the degree to which “there are things about America that make me feel ashamed.” Although the question does not explicitly elicit a comparison between the United States and other countries, feelings of shame in the country imply some external reference point from which the respondent renders that judgment. Among the GSS respondents, 26 percent did not feel ashamed of the United States, and 56 percent did feel ashamed (the remaining 18 percent chose the intermediate response category, neither agreeing nor disagreeing with the question prompt)." (p.9)
"Ardent nationalists. Members of the larger of the extreme classes (24 percent of all respondents), which we call the ardent nationalists, were more likely than members of any other class to feel very close to America; more likely to say it was “very important” for a true American to possess all seven characteristics about which respondents were asked; most likely to report being “very proud” of all 10 potential sources of pride; and more likely than any other to agree or strongly agree with all five measures of national hubris. Even though the ardent nationalists scored highest on every dimension of nationalism— identification, criteria, pride, and hubris—they were not completely indiscriminate in their responses. Large majorities viewed each criterion of being “truly American” as “very important,” nearly all endorsed citizenship, ability to speak English, feeling American, having lived in America most of one’s life, and respecting institutions and laws, but fewer believed it was very important that a true American be born in America (86 percent) or be a Christian (75 percent)." (p.10)
"Nonetheless, a large majority apparently viewed Jews, Muslims, agnostics, and naturalized citizens as something less than “truly American.” Nearly all the ardent nationalists reported being “very proud” of America’s armed forces, history, and achievements in science and technology. Considerably fewer expressed great pride in the country’s fair and equal treatment of all groups (51 percent), its political influence in the world (48 percent), or its social security system (28 percent).11 Other pride items fell in between. Every member of this class expressed a preference for being a citizen of the United States and all but six agreed that America is a “better country” than most others. Nearly two thirds (64 percent) felt the world would be a better place if people in other countries were more like Americans, and just 50 percent, even of this most nationalistic group, believed people should support their country if it was in the wrong. More ardent nationalists than members of any other class (43 percent) were unashamed of any aspects of America. As illustrated in Table 2, the typical member of this class was a white male observant Evangelical or Mainline Protestant with relatively little formal education, living in the South. The ardent nationalists were eight years older than the remainder of the sample, with a mean age of 51. They had moderately low incomes and were more likely than others to have discontinued their schooling after high school. Politically, the ardent nationalists were most likely to selfidentify as strong Republicans and were among the least likely to self-identify as Democrats. The minority who self-identified as Democrats were older and had even lower incomes than their Republican counterparts; they were also less likely to identify as white or as Protestant, to live in the South, or to report having no religion. They were, however, very similar in terms of gender and likelihood of having been born in the United States. There is evidence that at least some ardent nationalism is associated with military service. Although data on veteran status were not available, 18 percent of men in the ardent nationalist class (compared to between 5 and 8 percent in the other groups) reported that they belonged to veterans’ organizations." (pp.11-12)
"The disengaged. The other extreme class was the smallest, making up 17 percent of the sample. It consists of what we call the “disengaged”— disengaged from the nation because they withheld the strongest endorsement of even the most widely held nationalist beliefs and sentiments, because they professed particularly low levels of pride in state institutions, and because they appeared to refrain from wholesale engagement with a national identity. The strongest evidence for the latter inference comes from responses to the national identification item: only 21 percent of respondents in this group reported feeling very close to the nation, compared to 56 percent for the remainder of the sample. They were also least likely to endorse any characteristic as “very important” for being “truly American,” often by wide margins. For instance, just half rated as very important the ability to speak English, which 89 percent of other respondents viewed as constitutive of being truly American. Even citizenship was termed “very important” by just 47 percent. Other criteria, such as being Christian, being born in the United States, or having lived in the United States for most of one’s life, were endorsed as very important by fewer than one in six. Disengaged respondents were also less likely than members of other classes to express high levels of national pride. Some of these results suggest a negative evaluation of the United States’ performance on elements of the national creed: just 10 percent reported being “very proud” of how American democracy works; 7 percent expressed great pride in equal treatment of all groups; 20 percent expressed pride in American history; and only two people expressed strong pride in the nation’s political influence. But they also expressed lower levels of pride in fields like science and technology (42 percent) and arts and literature (31 percent), where American achievements arguably have been demonstrably significant. Such patterns suggest these respondents were not only critical of the United States on some dimensions, but they also identified less strongly with the country in general, taking less pride in American achievements because their nationality was linked less closely to their sense of self. Not surprisingly, the disengaged were also least likely to endorse any of the hubris items.
Who were these least nationalistic Americans ? With a mean age of 38 years, they were the youngest of any class. African Americans and respondents in the “other” race category were overrepresented in their ranks, as were respondents born outside the United States. Highly underrepresented in this class; Jews and respondents who chose “no religion” and “other” religion were overrepresented. Although the incomes of the disengaged were the lowest of the four classes, this is a function of their young age; among respondents who were 25 or older, the mean income of the disengaged exceeded that of restrictive and ardent nationalists (but not creedal nationalists). Just under 10 percent of respondents assigned to this class did not hold U.S. citizenship, and another 6 percent were foreign-born citizens. (Nearly half of non-citizens in the sample were classified as disengaged, compared to just about 14 percent of the foreign-born citizens.) It is not surprising that non-citizens would fall into this class. The foreign-born are statusinconsistent—those who were classified as disengaged were highly educated and relatively well paid, but also 62 percent non-white, predominantly non-Christian, and, of course, newcomers to the United States. Five percent of the disengaged were second-generation Americans, but more than three quarters were neither immigrants nor children of immigrants. The native-born members of this class were well educated, young, relatively more likely than respondents assigned to other classes to be non-white, and most likely to describe their religious faith as “none” (36 percent) and their political affiliation as Democrat (80 percent). In other words, the disengaged class mixes a relatively small set of prosperous immigrants whose views may reflect a lack of identification with the United States with a much larger set of relatively young and well-educated native-born respondents who favor Democrats and are often (but not exclusively) members of ethnoracial or religious minorities." (pp.12-14)
"Restrictive nationalists. Unlike the ardent nationalists and the disengaged, the two remaining classes did not fall into a monotonic continuum from more to less nationalistic. They were, however, moderate in very different ways. One class, which we call the restrictive nationalists, consisted of respondents who expressed only moderate levels of national pride but defined being “truly American” in particularly exclusionary ways. The other class, which we call creedal nationalists because their profile of attitudes suggests fidelity to the American creed of liberal universalism, consisted of respondents who expressed high levels of national pride alongside a reluctance to qualify “truly American” with many strong conditions. We begin with the former: the restrictive nationalists, who were the largest group, constituting 38 percent of the sample. Members of this group were moderate in their national identification and espoused modest levels of national hubris (less than either the ardent or creedal nationalists): 94 percent preferred to be U.S. citizens, 79 percent agreed that there is no better country than the United States, 43 percent agreed that people in other countries should be more like Americans, and 38 percent endorsed the view that one should support one’s country even when it is wrong. Only 18 percent reported never experiencing shame in the United States. Restrictive nationalists were also similar to, although less extreme than, the ardent nationalists in placing conditions on who should be viewed as a “true American.” Well over half strongly endorsed the view that only Christians can be “truly American”; nearly three in four believed it is “very important” that a “true American” be born in the United States or have lived in the United States for most of one’s life; and 69 percent viewed respect for American political institutions and laws as very important for being truly American. Given their high level of support for restrictive criteria of national membership, surprisingly few members of this class reported being “very proud” of American achievements. Indeed, their responses to the pride questions were closer—in most cases, much closer—to those of the disengaged than to those of the ardent nationalists or creedal nationalists. Majorities expressed
great pride only in America’s armed forces and its history. By contrast, just 13 percent reported being very proud of American democracy and just 9 percent expressed great pride in America’s global political influence.
Who were these respondents who defined true Americans so restrictively yet evinced such low levels of national pride ? A rough generalization would depict them as Americans who are disadvantaged with respect to some combination of race, gender, or social class. Women were overrepresented among the restrictive nationalists; average incomes were the second lowest of all the classes; and a relatively small percentage of these respondents continued their education beyond high school. African Americans were strongly overrepresented in this class (68 percent were assigned to this group), as were Hispanics.18 Black Protestants were also represented in large numbers (much more so than in any other class), as were Evangelical Protestants. Not surprisingly given their criteria for “true American” status, relatively few were born outside the United States. Politically, Independents were strongly overrepresented (almost half the Independents in the sample were in this class), suggesting a gravitation to the restricted class by the politically disaffected. Although moderate Democrat and Republican identifiers were nearly equally likely to be assigned to this class, strongly partisan Republicans were underrepresented (most of them were found among the ardent and, to a lesser extent, creedal classes), whereas strong Democrats were overrepresented, reflecting the different socioeconomic positions and racial compositions of these two groups. The vast majority of African Americans in this class were Democrats, even though 14 of the 18 African American respondents who declared themselves Republicans were assigned to this category. In contrast, Hispanic respondents who identified with the Democratic Party were underrepresented and those who identified with the Republican Party were overrepresented in this class. Overall, it seems likely that this form of nationalism reflects ressentiment more than ideology. Given the unexpected prominence of African Americans among restrictive nationalists, we checked to see if these results were artifacts of poorer assignment of non-whites to latent classes due to a combination of smaller numbers with possible model heterogeneity. We thus compared mean individual-level class assignment probabilities for blacks and whites in each of the four classes. The results, presented in Table 3, show that the differences in the precision of classification by race across the four classes are minor. In the case of the restrictive class, the mean classification probabilities for black respondents are actually higher than those for white respondents." (pp.14-15)
"Creedal nationalists. Creedal nationalism refers to the form of national selfunderstanding associated with a set of liberal principles—universalism, democracy, and the rule of law—sometimes referred to as the American creed (Hartz 1964; Lieven 2004; Lipset 1963). The class of respondents we call creedal nationalists, which accounts for 22 percent of the sample, fits this profile more aptly than any other. Their form of nationalism was high on national pride but placed few restrictions on who can claim to be “truly American.” Creedal nationalists exhibited high levels of national identification, with 65 percent reporting that they felt “very close” to America, a percentage comparable to that of the ardent nationalists. They were less likely than the ardent nationalists to report being “very proud” of American achievements, but more likely to do so than either restrictive nationalists or the disengaged. Fifty-seven percent expressed great pride in the “way democracy works,” compared to just 13 percent of the restrictive nationalists, and 67 percent expressed pride in America’s economic achievements. They rivaled the ardent nationalists in pride in science and technology, with 82 percent reporting high levels. Like all but the disengaged, they strongly endorsed the ideas that America is a better country than most and that it is better to be a citizen of the United States. Although they did not score as high on the hubris variables as did the ardent nationalists, a plurality agreed that the world would be better if others were more like Americans and that one should support one’s country even if it is wrong. Like the ardent nationalists, they were also much less likely than restrictive nationalists or the disengaged to feel ashamed of America. The differences between creedal and restrictive nationalists are especially evident in their responses to the questions about the qualities that are very important in making someone “truly American.” They were more likely than the restrictive nationalists (85 versus 69 percent) to say that respect for American institutions and laws was very important. In contrast, few regarded being a Christian (21 percent), having been born in the United States (16 percent), or having lived here most of one’s life (20 percent) as very important criteria. In other words, although the creedal nationalists differentiated between degrees of Americanness, unlike the restrictive nationalists they did not do so on the basis of ascribed characteristics. Who were these just over one in five Americans whose views most closely approximated what is purportedly the American creed ? For the most part, they were men and women upon whom fate had smiled. They were most likely of any group to hold advanced degrees and to have graduated college; their mean income of $78,582 was almost 40 percent higher than that of the next wealthiest group (the ardent nationalists). Consistent with their economic well-being, they were disproportionately Republican, almost as much so as the ardent nationalists (although with fewer strong partisans). They were more likely than any other group to have been born outside the United States (23 percent), and most of the foreign-born in this group possessed U.S. citizenship. Very few were African American or identified as Black Protestants. This class also included the largest share of respondents who classified themselves as racially other and as Jewish, with Catholics well represented (constituting at 28 percent a religious plurality) but Protestants, especially Evangelicals, less likely to be assigned to this group. Regionally, creedal nationalists were overrepresented in the Pacific and Mountain states and underrepresented in the Northeast and South. In other words, creedal nationalism is, to some extent, the ideology of men and women for whom the American Dream has worked. In many cases, however, their immigrant origins, religious faith, racial identities, or regional locations place them at the periphery of what is often represented as the American mainstream. We suspect this combination of economic success with biographical marginality produces an affinity for a broadly inclusive understanding of the nation." (p.16)
"Policies related to ethnic and racial minorities. Like the studies reviewed above, we find significant net associations of particular forms of nationalism with a range of attitudes. Even with extensive controls, the disengaged were more supportive of multiculturalism and related positions than were members of other classes. Consistent with their support for civic definitions of a “true American” and their low values on hubris, the disengaged were much more likely than others to endorse the view that the government should “respect and protect the rights of minorities” and that it is better if minorities “maintain their distinctive customs and traditions.” Despite their inclusive views of the criteria for national membership, creedal nationalists did not differ significantly from ardent nationalists in their responses to either item tapping attitudes toward multiculturalism. And although they were more likely to say that government should support minority rights than were restrictive nationalists, they were less so than the disengaged. Interestingly— and somewhat surprisingly—ardent nationalists were more likely than creedal nationalists to support government assistance for protecting minority cultures.
Attitudes toward immigrants. We would expect nationalist sentiments—especially sentiments about the nation’s boundaries—to be associated with views of immigrants (Bail 2008), and they were. Restrictive nationalists were significantly more likely than creedal nationalists and the disengaged to believe that immigrants increase crime rates and take jobs away from Americans; and they were significantly more likely than creedal nationalists, the disengaged, and ardent nationalists to disagree that immigration is helpful to the economy and that immigrants improve society by bringing in new ideas and cultures, as well as to agree that there is too much government spending on immigration. Ardent nationalists were also significantly more likely than creedal nationalists (and in most cases, the disengaged) to agree that immigrants cause crime and take away American jobs, that immigrants should not hold the same rights as citizens, and that more needs to be done to prevent illegal immigration. Yet a restrictive view of national membership was not a prerequisite to critical views of immigration: creedal nationalists were also significantly more likely than the disengaged to agree that immigration takes away Americans’ jobs, increases crime rates, and consumes too much government spending, as well as to disagree that immigrants improve society by bringing in new ideas and cultures. They were also more likely than disengaged respondents to favor additional measures against illegal immigration." (p.20)
"Attitudes concerning America’s boundaries. Attitudes toward immigrants are a special case of responses to the penetration of national boundaries by people, cultures, and money from abroad. Results here were similar, with the disengaged expressing the least agreement, and restrictive nationalists and ardent nationalists expressing the most agreement, with protectionist and isolationist views: both groups were significantly more likely than creedal nationalists or the disengaged to endorse the views that U.S. television programming should favor American content, that foreigners should not be permitted to own land in the United States, and that the United States should cut back on imports. Ardent nationalists appeared even more concerned than restrictive nationalists with cultural intrusions from abroad, as evidenced by their stronger support for the showcasing of American content on U.S. television." (p.21)
"Pride in the nation’s accomplishments and national identification may inoculate Americans to some degree against the most extreme forms of racial or ethnic exclusion and xenophobia. We see this in the fact that ardent nationalists were less extreme on some variables measuring these dimensions than were the restrictive nationalists." (p.21)
"A willingness to place ethnocultural restrictions on membership in the national community and what we call hubris are associated with negative views of immigrants and immigration and isolationist and protectionist orientations toward the rest of the world." (p.25)
-Bonikowski (Bart) et DiMaggio (Paul), "Varieties of American Popular Nationalism", American Sociological Review, 2016, v.81, n.5, pp.949–980.
