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    Peter Boghossian, Fear of Knowledge. Against Relativism and Constructivism

    Johnathan R. Razorback
    Johnathan R. Razorback
    Admin


    Messages : 20740
    Date d'inscription : 12/08/2013
    Localisation : France

    Peter Boghossian, Fear of Knowledge. Against Relativism and Constructivism Empty Peter Boghossian, Fear of Knowledge. Against Relativism and Constructivism

    Message par Johnathan R. Razorback Mer 12 Aoû - 23:00

    https://fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Peter_Boghossian

    https://twitter.com/peterboghossian/status/1435576254074220552 ; Peter Boghossian était, jusque-là, professeur de philosophie à l'université de Portland et célèbre pour sa participation au canular des publications pseudoscientifiques délirantes (grievances studies affair/canular Sokal²), publiées à dessein dans des revues à comité de lecture de sciences humaines pour révéler leur non-scientificité.

    https://bariweiss.substack.com/p/my-university-sacrificed-ideas-for

    "Dear Provost Susan Jeffords,

    ​​I’m writing to you today to resign as assistant professor of philosophy at Portland State University.

    Over the last decade, it has been my privilege to teach at the university. My specialties are critical thinking, ethics and the Socratic method, and I teach classes like Science and Pseudoscience and The Philosophy of Education. But in addition to exploring classic philosophers and traditional texts, I’ve invited a wide range of guest lecturers to address my classes, from Flat-Earthers to Christian apologists to global climate skeptics to Occupy Wall Street advocates. I’m proud of my work.

    I invited those speakers not because I agreed with their worldviews, but primarily because I didn’t. From those messy and difficult conversations, I’ve seen the best of what our students can achieve: questioning beliefs while respecting believers; staying even-tempered in challenging circumstances; and even changing their minds.

    I never once believed —  nor do I now —  that the purpose of instruction was to lead my students to a particular conclusion. Rather, I sought to create the conditions for rigorous thought; to help them gain the tools to hunt and furrow for their own conclusions. This is why I became a teacher and why I love teaching.

    But brick by brick, the university has made this kind of intellectual exploration impossible. It has transformed a bastion of free inquiry into a Social Justice factory whose only inputs were race, gender, and victimhood and whose only outputs were grievance and division.

    Students at Portland State are not being taught to think. Rather, they are being trained to mimic the moral certainty of ideologues. Faculty and administrators have abdicated the university’s truth-seeking mission and instead drive intolerance of divergent beliefs and opinions. This has created a culture of offense where students are now afraid to speak openly and honestly.

    I noticed signs of the illiberalism that has now fully swallowed the academy quite early during my time at Portland State. I witnessed students refusing to engage with different points of view.  Questions from faculty at diversity trainings that challenged approved narratives were instantly dismissed. Those who asked for evidence to justify new institutional policies were accused of microaggressions. And professors were accused of bigotry for assigning canonical texts written by philosophers who happened to have been European and male.  

    At first, I didn’t realize how systemic this was and I believed I could question this new culture. So I began asking questions. What is the evidence that trigger warnings and safe spaces contribute to student learning? Why should racial consciousness be the lens through which we view our role as educators? How did we decide that “cultural appropriation” is immoral?

    Unlike my colleagues, I asked these questions out loud and in public.

    I decided to study the new values that were engulfing Portland State and so many other educational institutions — values that sound wonderful, like diversity, equity, and inclusion, but might actually be just the opposite. The more I read the primary source material produced by critical theorists, the more I suspected that their conclusions reflected the postulates of an ideology, not insights based on evidence.

    I began networking with student groups who had similar concerns and brought in speakers to explore these subjects from a critical perspective. And it became increasingly clear to me that the incidents of illiberalism I had witnessed over the years were not just isolated events, but part of an institution-wide problem.

    The more I spoke out about these issues, the more retaliation I faced.

    Early in the 2016-17 academic year, a former student complained about me and the university initiated a Title IX investigation.  (Title IX investigations are a part of federal law designed to protect “people from discrimination based on sex in education programs or activities that receive federal financial assistance.”) My accuser, a white male, made a slew of baseless accusations against me, which university confidentiality rules unfortunately prohibit me from discussing further. What I can share is that students of mine who were interviewed during the process told me the Title IX investigator asked them if they knew anything about me beating my wife and children. This horrifying accusation soon became a widespread rumor.

    With Title IX investigations there is no due process, so I didn’t have access to the particular accusations, the ability to confront my accuser, and I had no opportunity to defend myself. Finally, the results of the investigation were revealed in December 2017. Here are the last two sentences of the report: “Global Diversity & Inclusion finds there is insufficient evidence that Boghossian violated PSU’s Prohibited Discrimination & Harassment policy. GDI recommends Boghossian receive coaching.”

    Not only was there no apology for the false accusations, but the investigator also told me that in the future I was not allowed to render my opinion about “protected classes” or teach in such a way that my opinion about protected classes could be known — a bizarre conclusion to absurd charges. Universities can enforce ideological conformity just through the threat of these investigations.

    I eventually became convinced that corrupted bodies of scholarship were responsible for justifying radical departures from the traditional role of liberal arts schools and basic civility on campus. There was an urgent need to demonstrate that morally fashionable papers — no matter how absurd — could be published. I believed then that if I exposed the theoretical flaws of this body of literature, I could help the university community avoid building edifices on such shaky ground.

    So, in 2017, I co-published an intentionally garbled peer-reviewed paper that took aim at the new orthodoxy. Its title: “The Conceptual Penis as a Social Construct.” This example of pseudo-scholarship, which was published in Cogent Social Sciences, argued that penises were products of the human mind and responsible for climate change. Immediately thereafter, I revealed the article as a hoax designed to shed light on the flaws of the peer-review and academic publishing systems.

    Shortly thereafter, swastikas in the bathroom with my name under them began appearing in two bathrooms near the philosophy department. They also occasionally showed up on my office door, in one instance accompanied by bags of feces. Our university remained silent. When it acted, it was against me, not the perpetrators.

    I continued to believe, perhaps naively, that if I exposed the flawed thinking on which Portland State’s new values were based, I could shake the university from its madness. In 2018 I co-published a series of absurd or morally repugnant peer-reviewed articles in journals that focused on issues of race and gender. In one of them we argued that there was an epidemic of dog rape at dog parks and proposed that we leash men the way we leash dogs. Our purpose was to show that certain kinds of “scholarship” are based not on finding truth but on advancing social grievances. This worldview is not scientific, and it is not rigorous.

    Administrators and faculty were so angered by the papers that they published an anonymous piece in the student paper and Portland State filed formal charges against me. Their accusation? “Research misconduct” based on the absurd premise that the journal editors who accepted our intentionally deranged articles were “human subjects.” I was found guilty of not receiving approval to experiment on human subjects.

    Meanwhile, ideological intolerance continued to grow at Portland State. In March 2018, a tenured professor disrupted a public discussion I was holding with author Christina Hoff Sommers and evolutionary biologists Bret Weinstein and Heather Heying. In June 2018, someone triggered the fire alarm during my conversation with popular cultural critic Carl Benjamin. In October 2018, an activist pulled out the speaker wires to interrupt a panel with former Google engineer James Damore. The university did nothing to stop or address this behavior. No one was punished or disciplined.

    For me, the years that followed were marked by continued harassment. I’d find flyers around campus of me with a Pinocchio nose. I was spit on and threatened by passersby while walking to class. I was informed by students that my colleagues were telling them to avoid my classes. And, of course, I was subjected to more investigation.

    I wish I could say that what I am describing hasn’t taken a personal toll. But it has taken exactly the toll it was intended to: an increasingly intolerable working life and without the protection of tenure.

    This isn’t about me. This is about the kind of institutions we want and the values we choose. Every idea that has advanced human freedom has always, and without fail, been initially condemned. As individuals, we often seem incapable of remembering this lesson, but that is exactly what our institutions are for: to remind us that the freedom to question is our fundamental right. Educational institutions should remind us that that right is also our duty.  

    Portland State University has failed in fulfilling this duty. In doing so it has failed not only its students but the public that supports it. While I am grateful for the opportunity to have taught at Portland State for over a decade, it has become clear to me that this institution is no place for people who intend to think freely and explore ideas.

    This is not the outcome I wanted. But I feel morally obligated to make this choice. For ten years, I have taught my students the importance of living by your principles. One of mine is to defend our system of liberal education from those who seek to destroy it. Who would I be if I didn’t?

    Sincerely,

    Peter Boghossian"
    -Peter Boghossian, lettre de démission de l'Université d'Etat de Portland, 8 septembre 2021: https://bariweiss.substack.com/p/my-university-sacrificed-ideas-for

    "
    -Peter Boghossian, Fear of Knowledge. Against Relativism and Constructivism,



    _________________
    « La question n’est pas de constater que les gens vivent plus ou moins pauvrement, mais toujours d’une manière qui leur échappe. » -Guy Debord, Critique de la séparation (1961).

    « Rien de grand ne s’est jamais accompli dans le monde sans passion. » -Hegel, La Raison dans l'Histoire.

    « Mais parfois le plus clair regard aime aussi l’ombre. » -Friedrich Hölderlin, "Pain et Vin".

    Johnathan R. Razorback
    Johnathan R. Razorback
    Admin


    Messages : 20740
    Date d'inscription : 12/08/2013
    Localisation : France

    Peter Boghossian, Fear of Knowledge. Against Relativism and Constructivism Empty Re: Peter Boghossian, Fear of Knowledge. Against Relativism and Constructivism

    Message par Johnathan R. Razorback Lun 11 Mar - 13:37



    "If this book appears to pay disproportionate attention to the work of Richard Rorty that is not only because of Rorty’s huge influence on contemporary constructivist views, but also because, as a first-year graduate student at Princeton in 1979, I first came to appreciate the power of these views in a seminar of his. Although they clashed with the strongly objectivist tendencies I had brought to graduate school from my undergraduate education in physics, I found the arguments for at least some constructivist theses —the ones concerning rational belief— disquieting, and thought that academic philosophy had been too quick to dismiss them. I have always been grateful to Rorty for having made me see the need to engage these ideas." (p.VI)

    "Especially within the academy, but also and inevitably to some extent outside of it, the idea that there are ‘‘many equally valid ways of knowing the world,’’ with science being just one of them, has taken very deep root. In vast stretches of the humanities and social sciences, this sort of ‘‘postmodernist relativism’’ about knowledge has achieved the status of orthodoxy. I shall call it (as neutrally as possible) the doctrine of Equal Validity." (p.2)

    "Ordinarily, we think that on a factual question like the one about American prehistory, there is a way things are that is independent of us and our beliefs about it—an objective fact of the matter, as we may put it, as to where the first Americans originated.

    We are not necessarily fact-objectivists in this sense about all domains of judgment. About morality, for example, some people, philosophers included, are inclined to be relativists: they hold that there are many alternative moral codes specifying what counts as good or bad conduct, but no facts by virtue of which some of these codes are more ‘correct’ than any of the others. Others may be relativists about aesthetics, about what counts as beautiful or artistically valuable. These sorts of relativism about value matters are debatable, of course, and still debated. However, even if we find them ultimately implausible, they do not immediately strike us as absurd. But on a factual question such as the one about the origins of the Wrst Americans, we are inclined to think, surely, there just is some objective fact of the matter.

    We may not know what this fact of the matter is, but, having formed an interest in the question, we seek to know it. And we have a variety of techniques and methods—observation, logic, inference to the best explanation and so forth, but not tea-leaf reading or crystal ball gazing—that we take to be the only legitimate ways of forming rational beliefs on the subject. These methods—the methods characteristic of what we call ‘science’ but which also characterize ordinary modes of knowledge-seeking—have led us to the view that the Wrst Americans came from Asia across the Bering Strait. This view may be false, of course, but it is the most reasonable one, given the evidence— or so we are ordinarily tempted to think.

    Because we believe all this, we defer to the deliverances of science: we assign it a privileged role in determining what to teach our children at school, what to accept as probative in our courts of law and what to base our social policies upon. We take there to be a fact of the matter as to what is true. We want to accept only what there is good reason to believe true ; and we take science to be the only good way to arrive at reasonable beliefs about what is true, at least in the realm of the purely factual. Hence, we defer to science.

    For this sort of deference to science to be right, however, scientiWc knowledge had better be privileged—it had better not be the case that there are many other, radically diVerent yet equally valid ways of knowing the world, with science being just one of them." (pp.3-4)

    "If the vast numbers of scholars in the humanities and social sciences who subscribe to it are right, we are not merely making a philosophical mistake of interest to a small number of specialists in the theory of knowledge ; we have fundamentally misconceived the principles by which society ought to be organized. There is more than the usual urgency, then, to the question whether they are right." (p.5)

    "Ideologically, the appeal of the docrine of equal validity cannot be detached from its emergence in the post-colonial era. Advocates of colonial expansion often sought to justify their projects by the claim that colonized subjects stood to gain much from the superior science and culture of the West. In a moral climate which has turned its back decisively on colonialism, it is appealing to many to say not only —what is true— that one cannot morally justify subjugating a sovereign people in the name of spreading knowledge, but that there is no such thing as superior knowledge only different knowledges, each appropriate to its own particular setting." (pp.5-6)

    "In recent times, the most influential versions of social dependence views of knowledge have been formulated in terms of the now ubiquitous notion of social construction. All knowledge, it is said, is socially dependent because all knowledge is socially constructed. In what follows, therefore, I shall be especially interested in social constructivist conceptions of knowledge." (pp.6-7)

    "One could cite a sizeable proportion of that tradition’s most prominent philosophers in their defense—Ludwig Wittgenstein, Rudolf Carnap, Richard Rorty, Thomas Kuhn, Hilary Putnam and Nelson Goodman, just for example. These philosophers in turn could appeal to some important intellectual precedents.

    Immanuel Kant famously denied that the world, insofar as we can know it, could be independent of the concepts in terms of which we grasp it. David Hume questioned our right to think that there is some uniquely correct set of epistemic principles that capture what it is for a belief to be rationally held. And Friedrich Nietzsche can be read as wondering whether we are ever really moved to belief byevidence, as opposed to the various other non-epistemic motives—self-interest or ideology—that could be acting upon us.

    But for all their distinguished intellectual pedigree and for all the attention they have received in recent times, it remains fair to say that such anti-objectivist conceptions of truth and rationality are not generally accepted within the mainstream of philosophy departments within the English-speaking world.

    The result has been a growing alienation of academic philosophy from the rest of the humanities and social sciences, leading to levels of acrimony and tension on American campuses that have prompted the label ‘‘Science Wars.’’ "(pp.7-8 )

    "I will isolate the three theses that, as it seems to me, a constructivism about knowledge could most interestingly amount to. And I will then attempt to assess their plausibility.

    The first thesis will be a constructivism about truth ; the second a constructivism about justification ; and the third, finally, will concern the role of social factors in explaining why we believe what we believe.

    Since each of these theses has an important and complex philosophical history, it would be unreasonable to expect a definitive assessment of their truth or falsity in this short book. I will attempt to show, however, that each of them is subject to very powerful objections, objections that help explain why contemporary analytic philosophers continue to reject them." (p.9)

    "A belief is a particular kind of mental state. If we ask precisely what kind of mental state it is, we Wnd that it is not easy to say. We can describe it in other words, of course, but only in ones that cry out for as much explanation as talk about belief. To believe that Jupiter has sixteen moons, we could say, is to take the world to be such that in it Jupiter has sixteen moons ; or to represent the world as containing a particular heavenly body with sixteen moons; and so forth.

    Although we may not be able to analyze belief in terms of significantly other concepts, we can see clearly that three aspects are essential to it. Any belief must have a propositional content ; any belief can be assessed as true or false; and any belief can be assessed as justiWed or unjustiWed, rational or irrational.

    Consider Margo’s belief that Jupiter has sixteen moons. We attribute this belief with the sentence:

    Margo believes that Jupiter has sixteen moons.

    That Jupiter has sixteen moons, we may say, is the propositional content of what Margo believes. The propositional content of a belief specifies how the world is according to the belief. It speciWes, in other words, a truth condition—how the world would have to be if the belief is to be true. Thus,

    Margo’s belief that Jupiter has sixteen moons is true if and only if Jupiter has sixteen moons

    As we may also put it, Margo’s belief is true if and only if it is a fact that Jupiter has sixteen moons.

    In general, then, we can say that

    S’s belief that p is true if and only if p

    with the left-hand side of this biconditional attributing truth to a belief with a given content, and the right-hand side describing the fact that would have to obtain if the attribution is to be true.

    A propositional content (or proposition, for short) is built up out of concepts. So, for someone to be able to believe the proposition that Jupiter has sixteen moons, they must have the concepts out of which that particular proposition is built, namely, the concept Jupiter, the concept having, the concept sixteen, and the concept moon." (pp.10-11)

    "This view of propositions is broadly Fregean. It is the view that I favor. However, none of the arguments in this book will depend crucially on whether we opt for a Fregean as opposed to a Millian view of propositions, according to which the constituents of propositions are not concepts but rather worldy items, such as Jupiter itself. For more on this distinction see Saul Kripke, Naming and Necessity." (note 1 p.11)
    -Peter Boghossian, Fear of Knowledge. Against Relativism and Constructivism, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 2006, 139 pages.




    _________________
    « La question n’est pas de constater que les gens vivent plus ou moins pauvrement, mais toujours d’une manière qui leur échappe. » -Guy Debord, Critique de la séparation (1961).

    « Rien de grand ne s’est jamais accompli dans le monde sans passion. » -Hegel, La Raison dans l'Histoire.

    « Mais parfois le plus clair regard aime aussi l’ombre. » -Friedrich Hölderlin, "Pain et Vin".


      La date/heure actuelle est Sam 16 Nov - 9:32