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https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Charvaka
https://iep.utm.edu/indmat/
"None ever made any serious attempt to make an impartial study of Indian materialism (Carvaka or Lokayata), and its impact on the other schools. Materialism has generally been neglected. Even an occasional mention of it is meant to condemn and malign it.
The religious men have nothing but contempt for the materialists. Gopinath Kaviraj observes,
“It is clear that in every system of thought, Hindu, Buddhist or Jaina—except Carvaka, the material principle is recognised as evil. Conceived as a power or potency only or even as an entity, it is the source of all misery and tribulation. Every school advocates, therefore, that the self to be released from the bondage of the world must be freed in every way from its association with matter. Moksa is impossible so long as matter sways the spirit through its functions. Every code of Ethico-Spiritual discipline is so designed as to ensure gradual purification of the self from the dominating effects of accumulated matter in the form of error, doubt, Vadasand, Karma, etc. and guarding the purified self against further inroads of the matter.” ." (pp.2-3)
"As religions, Hinduism, Buddhism and Jainism are surely spiritualistic, as perhaps all religions are, but their philosophical thought has quite a few aspects which are neither spiritualistic nor do they stand for any other-worldly attitude. That they do have doctrines and ideas which bring them nearer to materialism rather than to spiritualism or idealism shall be our endeavour to see. We have already referred to Dr. Radhakrishnan’s opinion that “the Indian mind has been traditionally exercised over the questions of the nature of Godhead’’ and the like—a view that may well make for a confusion of religion with philosophy. It is, ‘perhaps, with the intent of guarding us against this danger that he adds, “It is untrue to say that philosophy in India never became self-conscious or critical. Even in its early stages, rational reflection tended to correct religious belief... How completely free from traditional religion and bias the systems are will be obvious from the fact that the Sankhya is silent about the existence of God, though certain about its theoretical indemonstrability. Vaisesika and Yoga, while they admit a supreme being, do not consider him to be the creator of the universe, and Jaimini refers to God only to deny his providence and moral government of the world. The early Buddhist systems are known to be indifferent to God, and we have also the materialist Carvakas, ‘‘who deny God, ridicule the priests, revile the Vedas and seek salvation in pleasure.” He is more emphatic when he says, “the supremacy of religion and of social tradition in life does not hamper the free pursuit of philosophy....Reason freely questions and criticises the creeds in which men are born. That is why the heretic, the sceptic, the unbeliever, the rationalist and the free thinker, the materialist and the hedonist all flourish in the soil of India.’” ."(pp.3-4)
"Our reason in not following this line of thought is that we are interested in the history of Indian thought as such, and not in the history (precise conditions) of India as determining the rise or fall of this particular thought we turned or that. We leave the latter task for the historian and would be content to pursue the former as may be expected from a student of philosophy." (p.14)
"Materialism is a philosophical theory that stands for a world-affirming Empiricism, Realism, Naturalism, Atheism and Hedonism, etc. in its various aspects.
Epistemologically, it accepts realistic and rationalistic empiricism as its method of knowledge and rejects transcendentalistic-intuitionism, pure-rationalism, idealism -critical or otherwise- and phenomenalism. Understanding perception in the commonsense-way as against the Locke-Berkeley-Hume interpretation, it makes sense-perception as the basis of knowledge. Regarding sensations as tools of perception, it stoutly refuses to reduce percepts to mere sensations and connects them with the physical objects existing independently of the perceiving subjectfs. Unlike phenomenalism, it holds that the truth of a proposition consists in its being a case of "knowledge-about", and like pragmatism, it accepts that the test of truth "lies in praxis or directed-actions." But, in so far as materalism, unlike pragmatism and positivism, takes its ontology seriously -because of which "the view that matter is independent of cognition is essential to materialism- it insists on epistemological realism as against idealism or mentalism, and asserts that "thought from perception to judgment always refers to something beyond itself". Giving to perception the central position in its epistemology, it does not set aside the role of reason (logic) in the advancement of knowledge as it does accept that we aided by logic in reaching generalisations by connecting experiences gained through perception.
In ontology, considering "the reality of the cosmos as autonomous and objectively given", materialism begins and proceeds by insisting on "physical realism" and pluralism of the observed thing and objects. But, in so far as it "gives unity to all that is real" by putting matter at the base of each phenomenon and "exhibiting the fundamental relation between the phenomenon and its substratum", one of its fundamental dogmas happens to be "the sole reality of matter". It is a monistic doctrine that rejects the existence of all transcendental entities such as God, soul and the like and explains all our experiences of perceiving, feeling, willing, knowing and thinking -minding along with the objects minded to- in terms of matter and its functioning. "It explains so much so well" because it does not extend its dogmatism to stick to a particular definition of matter arrived at by any of its kwown exponents in the course of its history. It is its flexibility here that makes us think with Jacobi that matter is "something that may become any thing", and explains for us the fact that matter can be conceived as atomic as well as ubiquitous, solid, inert, impenetrable extensions as well as wavy, thought-like energy.
Rejecting both teleology (niyati) and the rule of chance (Yadrccha) and insisting on its second fundamental dogma, "the reign of Law", materialism adopts "Evolutionary-Naturalism" (svabhavavada) as its cosmological theory. Believing in the Democritian dictum that "nothing arises out of nothing" and in "the instinsic endurance and immanent existence of material systems (the mattar)", it is natural for a materialist to hold that nature exists and endures by itself. Nature is self-sufficient and provides both material as well as efficient cause for all changes and developments taking place within it. There is no need for any supernatural agency as matter possesses an "internal-go", a spontaneity that makes it evolve into better-organised, complicated and more-integrated "action-patterns" that represent for us life and mind. Placing "spontaneity" at the heart of matter, materialism also seems to avoid the charge of mechanomorphism, even as it rejects teleology which smarcks of anthropomorphism. Nature for the materialist is a system of interrelated phenomena.
In axiology, denial of any purpose and a purposive-being outside nature, naturally, leads the materialist to conceive of values and purposes only in the context of human desires and aspiration. Rejecting an absolutistic ethics, he is prone to accept relativity in the matters moral, and regards good and bas as relative terms. Believing in the "reign of Law" and "autonomy of Nature", he does not seem to have any use for the concepts like "freedom of will" and therefore, replaces them by "internal-go" and "integrative level" through which he explains the apparently purposive human conduct. It is usual to represent a materialist as an egoistic-sensualist or an irresponsible pleasure-seeker -describing him wrongly as an Epicurean in ethics. But a materialist need not to be an egoist in so far as his credo does not include any of the fundamental propositions of egoism, namely, a) ego or self has an independent existence, and b) all desires are selfish in character. He does, have a place for sensuous enjoyment in the over-all scheme of things, but need not be a mere sensualist also, in so far as he recognises "integrative levels" highter than that of the senses as part and parcel of human personality. He is, however, a hedonist in as much as "his ideal is that of happiness which results from the harmonious concord of the whole human nature." (pp.15-17)
"Men of religion have lamented of ‘the growing materialism” in every age. Surely, in fighting against materialism with the seriousness and vehemence of great enthusiasts in philosophy, they were not fighting against a phantom. Materialism, despite its being neglected, condemned and maligned, has persisted right from the times of the Vedas to our own day, though no eminent philosopher ever advocated it, i.e. it has been seldom outspoken but hidden and veiled. Contrary to the general belief implied in the ‘oft-repeated jargon: “The spiritualist East and the materialist West” [...] there seems to a remarkable similarity between the Indian and the Western attitude towards materialism as regards philosophical thought." (p.18)
[Chapitre 2 : THE CARVAKA—LOKAYATA THOUGHT]
"Indian philosophy does have, indeed, its own school of materialistic thought." (p.22)
"All our information about the system (or Indian materialistic doctrines) is drawn from the brief accounts of the system and numerous references to its doctrines occurring in the works of its opponents and critics (belonging to both heterodox— Jainism, Buddhism and orthodox Nyaya-vaisesika, Samkhyayoga and Mimansa schools), philosophical thinkers, poets and dramatists, historians and writers on polity, philologists and grammarians." (p.25)
p.29
-Kewal Krishan Mittal, Materialism in Indian Thought, New Delhi, Munihiram Manoharlal Publishers Pvt. Ltd., 1974, 336 pages.
https://iep.utm.edu/indmat/
"None ever made any serious attempt to make an impartial study of Indian materialism (Carvaka or Lokayata), and its impact on the other schools. Materialism has generally been neglected. Even an occasional mention of it is meant to condemn and malign it.
The religious men have nothing but contempt for the materialists. Gopinath Kaviraj observes,
“It is clear that in every system of thought, Hindu, Buddhist or Jaina—except Carvaka, the material principle is recognised as evil. Conceived as a power or potency only or even as an entity, it is the source of all misery and tribulation. Every school advocates, therefore, that the self to be released from the bondage of the world must be freed in every way from its association with matter. Moksa is impossible so long as matter sways the spirit through its functions. Every code of Ethico-Spiritual discipline is so designed as to ensure gradual purification of the self from the dominating effects of accumulated matter in the form of error, doubt, Vadasand, Karma, etc. and guarding the purified self against further inroads of the matter.” ." (pp.2-3)
"As religions, Hinduism, Buddhism and Jainism are surely spiritualistic, as perhaps all religions are, but their philosophical thought has quite a few aspects which are neither spiritualistic nor do they stand for any other-worldly attitude. That they do have doctrines and ideas which bring them nearer to materialism rather than to spiritualism or idealism shall be our endeavour to see. We have already referred to Dr. Radhakrishnan’s opinion that “the Indian mind has been traditionally exercised over the questions of the nature of Godhead’’ and the like—a view that may well make for a confusion of religion with philosophy. It is, ‘perhaps, with the intent of guarding us against this danger that he adds, “It is untrue to say that philosophy in India never became self-conscious or critical. Even in its early stages, rational reflection tended to correct religious belief... How completely free from traditional religion and bias the systems are will be obvious from the fact that the Sankhya is silent about the existence of God, though certain about its theoretical indemonstrability. Vaisesika and Yoga, while they admit a supreme being, do not consider him to be the creator of the universe, and Jaimini refers to God only to deny his providence and moral government of the world. The early Buddhist systems are known to be indifferent to God, and we have also the materialist Carvakas, ‘‘who deny God, ridicule the priests, revile the Vedas and seek salvation in pleasure.” He is more emphatic when he says, “the supremacy of religion and of social tradition in life does not hamper the free pursuit of philosophy....Reason freely questions and criticises the creeds in which men are born. That is why the heretic, the sceptic, the unbeliever, the rationalist and the free thinker, the materialist and the hedonist all flourish in the soil of India.’” ."(pp.3-4)
"Our reason in not following this line of thought is that we are interested in the history of Indian thought as such, and not in the history (precise conditions) of India as determining the rise or fall of this particular thought we turned or that. We leave the latter task for the historian and would be content to pursue the former as may be expected from a student of philosophy." (p.14)
"Materialism is a philosophical theory that stands for a world-affirming Empiricism, Realism, Naturalism, Atheism and Hedonism, etc. in its various aspects.
Epistemologically, it accepts realistic and rationalistic empiricism as its method of knowledge and rejects transcendentalistic-intuitionism, pure-rationalism, idealism -critical or otherwise- and phenomenalism. Understanding perception in the commonsense-way as against the Locke-Berkeley-Hume interpretation, it makes sense-perception as the basis of knowledge. Regarding sensations as tools of perception, it stoutly refuses to reduce percepts to mere sensations and connects them with the physical objects existing independently of the perceiving subjectfs. Unlike phenomenalism, it holds that the truth of a proposition consists in its being a case of "knowledge-about", and like pragmatism, it accepts that the test of truth "lies in praxis or directed-actions." But, in so far as materalism, unlike pragmatism and positivism, takes its ontology seriously -because of which "the view that matter is independent of cognition is essential to materialism- it insists on epistemological realism as against idealism or mentalism, and asserts that "thought from perception to judgment always refers to something beyond itself". Giving to perception the central position in its epistemology, it does not set aside the role of reason (logic) in the advancement of knowledge as it does accept that we aided by logic in reaching generalisations by connecting experiences gained through perception.
In ontology, considering "the reality of the cosmos as autonomous and objectively given", materialism begins and proceeds by insisting on "physical realism" and pluralism of the observed thing and objects. But, in so far as it "gives unity to all that is real" by putting matter at the base of each phenomenon and "exhibiting the fundamental relation between the phenomenon and its substratum", one of its fundamental dogmas happens to be "the sole reality of matter". It is a monistic doctrine that rejects the existence of all transcendental entities such as God, soul and the like and explains all our experiences of perceiving, feeling, willing, knowing and thinking -minding along with the objects minded to- in terms of matter and its functioning. "It explains so much so well" because it does not extend its dogmatism to stick to a particular definition of matter arrived at by any of its kwown exponents in the course of its history. It is its flexibility here that makes us think with Jacobi that matter is "something that may become any thing", and explains for us the fact that matter can be conceived as atomic as well as ubiquitous, solid, inert, impenetrable extensions as well as wavy, thought-like energy.
Rejecting both teleology (niyati) and the rule of chance (Yadrccha) and insisting on its second fundamental dogma, "the reign of Law", materialism adopts "Evolutionary-Naturalism" (svabhavavada) as its cosmological theory. Believing in the Democritian dictum that "nothing arises out of nothing" and in "the instinsic endurance and immanent existence of material systems (the mattar)", it is natural for a materialist to hold that nature exists and endures by itself. Nature is self-sufficient and provides both material as well as efficient cause for all changes and developments taking place within it. There is no need for any supernatural agency as matter possesses an "internal-go", a spontaneity that makes it evolve into better-organised, complicated and more-integrated "action-patterns" that represent for us life and mind. Placing "spontaneity" at the heart of matter, materialism also seems to avoid the charge of mechanomorphism, even as it rejects teleology which smarcks of anthropomorphism. Nature for the materialist is a system of interrelated phenomena.
In axiology, denial of any purpose and a purposive-being outside nature, naturally, leads the materialist to conceive of values and purposes only in the context of human desires and aspiration. Rejecting an absolutistic ethics, he is prone to accept relativity in the matters moral, and regards good and bas as relative terms. Believing in the "reign of Law" and "autonomy of Nature", he does not seem to have any use for the concepts like "freedom of will" and therefore, replaces them by "internal-go" and "integrative level" through which he explains the apparently purposive human conduct. It is usual to represent a materialist as an egoistic-sensualist or an irresponsible pleasure-seeker -describing him wrongly as an Epicurean in ethics. But a materialist need not to be an egoist in so far as his credo does not include any of the fundamental propositions of egoism, namely, a) ego or self has an independent existence, and b) all desires are selfish in character. He does, have a place for sensuous enjoyment in the over-all scheme of things, but need not be a mere sensualist also, in so far as he recognises "integrative levels" highter than that of the senses as part and parcel of human personality. He is, however, a hedonist in as much as "his ideal is that of happiness which results from the harmonious concord of the whole human nature." (pp.15-17)
"Men of religion have lamented of ‘the growing materialism” in every age. Surely, in fighting against materialism with the seriousness and vehemence of great enthusiasts in philosophy, they were not fighting against a phantom. Materialism, despite its being neglected, condemned and maligned, has persisted right from the times of the Vedas to our own day, though no eminent philosopher ever advocated it, i.e. it has been seldom outspoken but hidden and veiled. Contrary to the general belief implied in the ‘oft-repeated jargon: “The spiritualist East and the materialist West” [...] there seems to a remarkable similarity between the Indian and the Western attitude towards materialism as regards philosophical thought." (p.18)
[Chapitre 2 : THE CARVAKA—LOKAYATA THOUGHT]
"Indian philosophy does have, indeed, its own school of materialistic thought." (p.22)
"All our information about the system (or Indian materialistic doctrines) is drawn from the brief accounts of the system and numerous references to its doctrines occurring in the works of its opponents and critics (belonging to both heterodox— Jainism, Buddhism and orthodox Nyaya-vaisesika, Samkhyayoga and Mimansa schools), philosophical thinkers, poets and dramatists, historians and writers on polity, philologists and grammarians." (p.25)
p.29
-Kewal Krishan Mittal, Materialism in Indian Thought, New Delhi, Munihiram Manoharlal Publishers Pvt. Ltd., 1974, 336 pages.
